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Translational Ecology and Environmental Law
Robert W. Adler
(Environmental Law, publication expected 2020)
Abstract
Translational ecology is a comparatively new approach to the pursuit of ecology and other
environmental sciences, the implications of which for environmental law have not previously been
explored significantly. Emulating the concepts of translational medicine, proponents of
transactional ecology seek to increase the relevance of their research to important environmental
problems by improving how effectively they communicate research results to end users of that
science, collaborating with those end users to identify research that is “actionable” rather than
purely “curiosity-driven” or theoretical, recognizing that values as well as science have a
legitimate role in environmental decisions, and engaging in ongoing dialogues about the
relationship between science and other issues and values to build trust across disciplines. Several
major federal environmental statutes provide examples of ways in which the practice of
translational ecology could contribute to better implementation of environmental laws. More
broadly, translational ecology has the potential to transform the relationship between science and
law in setting and implementing environmental policy.
Table of Contents
I.

Introduction
In 2010, Dr. William H. Schlesinger published an editorial in Science advocating for a new

approach to the science of applied ecology.1 Borrowing from the concept of translational medicine 2
and other efforts to promote “usable science,” 3 Schlesinger argued that ecologists need to
transcend pure science and to become more actively involved in communicating the implications
and application of their research for environmental policy. That effort, he argued, required a
“constant, two-way communication between stakeholders and scientists,” and efforts to synthesize

Distinguished Professor, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. This article is based on a plenary
presentation to the annual meeting of the Society of Freshwater Science (SFS) in Salt Lake City, Utah, May 22, 2019.
The presentation was called “Dormant Opportunities: Translational Ecology and the Clean Water Act.” This article
expands on the themes presented in that talk. The author appreciates the invitation from Dr. Jennifer Tank of the
University of Notre Dame, then President of SFS.
1 W.H. Schlesinger, Translational Ecology, 329 SCIENCE 609 (2010).
2 See Francesco M. Marincola, Translational Medicine: A two-way road, 1 J. TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE (2003),
available at https://doi.org/10.1186/1479-5876-1-1.
3 See, generally, University of Colorado and Arizona State University, Science Policy Assessment and Research on
Climate Change Program, Usable Science: A Handbook for Science Policy Decision Makers, available at
https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/research_areas/sparc/outreach/sparc_handbook/refs.html.]
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existing scientific knowledge to articulate its relevance to policy. 4 Schlesinger’s seminal plea led
to additional work by interdisciplinary teams of scientists to explicate, develop, and promote the
concept of translational ecology. 5
Schlesinger’s core idea is that ecologists should not remain aloof from the public policy
implications of their work, and should conduct policy-relevant research rather than work that is
interesting or important solely from a scientific perspective. 6 This assertion parallels a broader
discussion about the responsibility of scientists to engage in important public policy
conversations,7 if not to play an active advocacy role where they believe that existing law and
policy run afoul of important scientific information.8 Some scientists, however, believe that
advocacy can compromise the appropriate role of scientists and the objectivity that is fundamental
to scientific inquiry.9
Translational ecologists seek to increase the relevance of their research to environmental
policy, and environmental policy is necessarily guided or directed by environmental law. Much of

Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 609.
See infra Part II.
6 Others describe the traditional approach to science as “curiosity-driven” or a “theory-driven” inquiry. See Mark W.
Schwartz, et al., Developing a Translational Ecology Workforce, 15 FRONT. IN ECOL. AND THE ENV’T. 587, 587
(2017).
7 See, e.g., Brendan E. Mackey, Comment: Environmental Scientists, Advocacy, and the Future of the Earth, 26
ENVT’L CONSERVATION 245, 249 (1999) (arguing that “scientists have a responsibility to engage in public debate
about the state of the environment, so that people can make informed decisions about the kind of world they are
creating”).
8 For an example of scientists taking a more active advocacy role directly relevant to the conference presentation that
inspires this article, see Letter dated April 12, 2019 from Dr. Jennifer Tank, President, Society for Freshwater Science
to Mr. Andrew Wheeler, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Mr. R.D. James, Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works (transmitting comments of the Society for Freshwater Science on proposed
amendments to definition of “waters of the United States, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149) (on file with
author). The comment letter begins by noting that the Society for Freshwater Science, on behalf of its more than 1,000
member scientists “strongly opposes the proposed rule.” Id. at 1.
9 See Robert T. Lackey, Science, Scientists, and Policy Advocacy, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 12, 16 (2007)
(encouraging scientists to contribute to contribute to public discourse but only within the scope of their scientific
expertise, while cautioning against advocacy based on individual opinions and values); J. Scott Armstrong, Advocacy
and Objectivity in Science, 5 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 423, 427 (1979) (concluding based on a comparison of
alternative methods in management science that scientists who advocate for particular hypotheses showed less
objectivity than those who tested competing hypotheses). Armstrong was using the term “advocacy” in a slightly
different way than suggested by Schlesinger, but Armstrong’s point would be even more relevant to policy advocacy.
But see, John E. Kotcher, et al., Does Engagement in Advocacy Hurt the Credibility of Scientists? Results from a
Randomized National Survey Experiment, 11 ENVT’L COMMUNICATION 415, 423-26 (2017) (suggesting that
participation in advocacy by climate scientists and other scientists does not necessarily harm their credibility); Michael
P. Nelson & John A. Vucetich, On Advocacy by Environmental Scientists: What, Whether, Why and How, 23
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1090, 1099 (2009) (concluding, based on a comprehensive review of literature arguing for
and against advocacy by environmental scientists, that “scientists, by virtue of being citizens first and scientists second,
have a responsibility to advocate to the best of their abilities and in a justified and transparent manner”).
4
5
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the literature regarding translational ecology addresses its relationship to environmental law,
however, only through this inference.10 Environmental lawyers have not yet become a significant
part of the translational ecology discussion, and they have not yet participated in the
interdisciplinary teams exploring this new approach. This article begins the process of bridging
that gap.
Part II describes the evolving practice of translational ecology in more detail. In addition
to ensuring that readers understand the goals and methods of translational ecology, it identifies key
principles of that process that may be relevant to the implementation of environmental law. It also
distinguishes translational ecology from other concepts of applied ecology that have been
identified in the past as relevant to environmental and natural resources law.11 What new ideas are
added by translational ecology, the legal implications of which have not been explored through
the lenses of these other practices?
Part III of the article explores ways in which translational ecology might be helpful in
improving implementation of some of the major U.S. federal environmental statutes, but it also
probes its potential limitations in that regard. This analysis begins with the Clean Water Act,12
both because of the ecological focus of that statute, and because my exploration of those
possibilities for the annual meeting of the Society for Freshwater Science 13 began and inspired the
rest of this analysis. Other statutes that will be explored in detail for purposes of example include
the National Environmental Policy Act 14 and the Endangered Species Act, 15 but translational
ecology could also be applicable to many other federal environmental and natural resource
management statutes.16
Using these examples as a foundation, Part IV explores the broader implications of
translational ecology for the relationship between environmental law and environmental science.

One analysis cites law as one example of the kinds of cross-disciplinary knowledge ecologists should have to
practice translational ecology. See Schwartz, et al., supra note 6, at 587, 588 Panel 1.
11 See infra Part II.B.
12 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.; see infra Part II.B.1.
13 See supra note *.
14 42 U.S.C. §4331 et seq.; see infra Part II.B.2.
15 16 U.S.C. §1651 et seq.; see infra Part II.B.3.
16 Examples include the natural resource damage assessment process in the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§9607(a)(4)(C), 9607(f) (providing for assessment of natural
resource damages by government trustees of natural resources impaired or destroyed by releases of hazardous
substances); and the public land and natural resource inventory and planning processes mandated by statutes such as
the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§1711-1712.
10
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As I have suggested elsewhere,17 that relationship is neither static nor unidirectional, but rather
reflects a far more dynamic relationship rather than one in which science simply serves
informational needs in the legal process or law effectuates information and knowledge produced
by science.18 Part IV suggests that the collaboration and trust building advocated by proponents of
translational ecology could help to shift the focus of environmental law and policymaking to
consideration and balancing of legitimate competing values rather than adversarial disputes about
the science needed to inform the policy discourse.
Part V concludes that translational ecology shares some of the attributes of earlier efforts
to apply ecological science to environmental law and policy in a dynamic, interdisciplinary, and
participatory way, but it also shares some of their limitations in addressing some of environmental
law’s most intractable issues. It adds some important new ideas and mechanisms to those earlier
practices, however, that could facilitate more productive partnerships between applied
environmental scientists, environmental lawyers, environmental policymakers, and affected
stakeholders.
II.

The Evolving Practice of Translational Ecology
Lawyers and scientists often see the world very differently, leading to what some

commentators have referred to as a “culture clash” between the two disciplines. 19 Scientists and
lawyers use language in different ways, approach problems differently, and seek different goals. 20
Scientific language tends to be descriptive and explanatory; legal language tends to be normative
and prescriptive. Scientists form plausible hypotheses and collect data to determine how well the
data fit the hypothesis or the hypothesis explains the data, 21 in an iterative process.22 Lawyers use

See Robert W. Adler, The Coevolution of Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 44 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
1 (2019).
18 See id. at 5-9, 62-65.
19 See STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA (1994); SHEILA JASANOFF: SCIENCE AT
THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN A MERICA 7 (1995) (identifying a “culture clash” between lawyers and
scientists due to their fundamentally different enterprises); ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 5 (1998) (discussing a “clash of cultures” between law and
social science); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW xiii (1999)
(noting that lawyers and scientists see the world through different lenses); see, generally, Robert W. Adler, The
Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science in Environmental Law, 27 VERMONT L. REV. 249, 346-48
(2003).
20 See JASANOFF, supra note 19, at 7.
21 See DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND CONCEPTUAL
DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 26 (1st ed. 1988) (describing science as a “process by which scientists go from some
knowledge to more knowledge”).
22 See GOLDBERG, supra note 19, at 8.
17
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data to prove or disprove a particular fact or circumstance, with judges applying different burdens
of proof depending on the nature of the process. Scientists accept doubt and uncertainty 23 and
remain open and flexible to accommodate evolving hypotheses and new or more robust or reliable
data; lawyers and their clients seek some degree of certainty and stability to support new or existing
institutions, business relationships, etc.24
These differences can affect the relationship between lawyers and scientists in
environmental law 25 and in other areas of law. Lawyers often look to scientists to help them
achieve a particular legal outcome, such as adoption of a regulation, issuance of a permit, or
successful prosecution or defense of a lawsuit. Scientists expect the legal process to reflect and
respond to changes in scientific knowledge and understanding, particularly in rapidly evolving
fields of science such as ecology and other environmental sciences.26
As one potential way to explain the relationship between law and science, in previous work
I differentiated between “scientific knowledge” and “regulatory knowledge,” noting that they
serve different but overlapping functions.27 Scientific knowledge improves our understanding of
the world around us, and may have utilitarian or non-utilitarian value.28 Regulatory knowledge, by
contrast, is knowledge or understanding with legal or regulatory significance. 29 Regulatory
knowledge includes scientific knowledge where it is relevant to regulatory decisions.30 It also
transcends pure scientific knowledge, however, to include other forms of knowledge relevant to
regulatory decisions, such as law, policy, economics, and social values.31
This relationship between scientific knowledge and regulatory knowledge also suggests
that each kind of knowledge feeds off the other in an iterative way. Law responds to advances in
scientific knowledge by determining the degree to which that new knowledge is relevant to
See Karen Locke, Karen Golden-Biddle & Martha S. Feldman, Perspective—Making Doubt Generative: Rethinking
the Role of Doubt in the Research Process, 19 ORG. SCI. 907, 908-11 (2008).
24 See FAIGMAN, supra note 19, at 51; GOLDBERG, supra note 19, at 22; JASANOFF, supra note 19, at 9.
25 See, generally, Oliver A. Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 17
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 163 (2003); Adler, supra note 19.
26 See, e.g. THEO COLBORN, DIANNE DUMANOSKI & JOHN PETERSON MYERS, OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE
THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL? A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1996) (critiquing the
failure of the legal process to respond to scientific discoveries about the impact of endocrine disruptors on human
health and the environment).
27 See Adler, supra note 19, at 28-30.
28 See id. at 28.
29 See id.
30 I use the term “regulatory” in the broadest sense. For example, it could encompass a decision on whether to legislate,
and how; whether to adopt regulations, and in what form; and whether to allow or prohibit a particular activity.
31 See Adler, supra note 19, at 28-29.
23
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regulatory decisions and uses that knowledge to advance legal objectives.32 Science responds to
new or evolving legal theories and requirements, such as a new or amended statute or regulation,
by developing the scientific or technical basis or support for regulatory approaches or decisions.
Translational ecology is one of several methods of applied science suggested to address
these issues in the context of environmental policy. Predecessor practices have included
conservation biology, adaptive management, ecosystem management, and watershed
management. The discussion below first explains the basic principles of translational ecology as
they have evolved thus far. It then compares and contrasts those principles with those developed
through existing modes of interdisciplinary collaboration.
A. Principles of Translational Ecology
Schlesinger’s seminal editorial in Science proposed several basic principles to encourage
ecologists to make their research more relevant to pressing environmental issues such as climate
change, oil spills, and invasive species. 33 His most basic plea was for ecologists to communicate
ecological information accurately but in ways that various stakeholders 34 can understand. That
invitation, however, is coextensive with the general goal of better science communication shared
by many scientific disciplines.35
The somewhat more ambitious aspect of Schlesinger’s agenda was his call for “a new
partnership between scientists and advocacy groups.”36 Although the term “advocacy” might
suggest a focus on nonprofit environmental advocacy groups, his examples of existing
collaborations were broader, including one partnership between ecologists and the advocacy group
Earth Justice, and another between wetland ecologists and the U.S. Environmental Protection
For example, lawyers might use improved scientific knowledge to prove or defend against elements of existing legal
claims, or to test new legal claims. Likewise, new scientific knowledge might be used to advocate for or again new
legislation or regulation.
33 Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 609.
34 Schlesinger gave as examples of stakeholders “policy-makers, resource managers, public health officials, and the
general public.” Id. He did not expressly include lawyers, but lawyers overlap some of the other categories.
35 See Sara E. Brownell, Jordan V. Price, and Lawrence Steinman, Opinion, Science Communication to the General
Public: Why We Need to Teach Undergraduate and Graduate Science Students this Skill as Part of Their Formal
Scientific Training, 12 J. OF UNDERGRADUATE NEUROSCIENCE EDUC. E-6 , E-6 (2013) (beginning from the assumed
premise that “[c]ommunication of science to the general public is increasingly recognized as a responsibility of
scientists ….”). As noted by two later proponents of translational ecology: “Translational environmental science is
not just about communicating better. It is also about listening better.” Mark W. Brunson & Michelle A. Baker,
Translational Training for Tomorrow’s Environmental Scientists, 6 J. ENVIRON. STUD. SCI. 295, 296 (2016). For
discussions of the field of science communication, see, generally, Dan M. Kahan, What is the “science of science
communication?,” 14 J. OF SCI. COMMUNICATION 1 (2015); T.W. Burns, D.J. O’Connor, & S.M. Stockmayer, Science
Communication: A Contemporary Definition, 12 PUBLIC UNDERSTAND. SCI. 183 (2003).
36 Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 609.
32
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Agency (EPA).37 Moreover, his generic call was to use “interdisciplinary teams of scientists,
engineers, public health experts, and members of the end-user community,” without specifying a
particular “side” of the end-user community.38
Schlesinger’s real focus seems to be on the word “partnership” and the bidirectional
communication needed to ensure that ecological science is both used and useful:
Translational ecology requires constant two-way communications between stakeholders
and scientists. It should continually alert scientists to aspects of the environment in need of
study to produce new data, while clearly synthesizing what is already known from field
studies and its relevance to policy. The partnership’s purpose should be to ensure that all
stakeholders know the implications of scientific discoveries and understand their impact
on alternative ecological diagnoses. 39
Thus, Schlesinger argued more for better, more inclusive, and more effective process rather than
particular environmental policies. To the extent that he articulated a goal, it was to find a method
to guide ecologists’ decisions on what to study to make their work more relevant to policy, and to
help scientists communicate that information in understandable and policy-relevant ways.
Other researchers have pursued Schlesinger’s ideas in more depth, in part by convening
multidisciplinary groups of professionals in fields such as ecology, environmental education,
epidemiology and public health, science communication, science education, science policy, and
social-ecological systems. 40 These collaborations have added a number of key elements to the
concept of translational ecology.
First, although this was perhaps implicit in Schlesinger’s claim, later proponents of
translational ecology asserted that environmental research is often “ignored or incompletely
applied,” but humbly placed the blame for those failures on scientists rather than the end users of
the science.41 The main reason for that deficiency, they asserted, is a combination of the failure of
scientists to make their findings “accessible and understandable to nonscientists,” and the failure
of scientists to conduct the research most relevant to key policy decisions,42 citing an “imperfect
Id.
Id.
39 Id.
40 See Brunson & Baker, supra note 35, at 296-97.
41 See id. at 295.
42 Id. In fairness, blame for the science-policy gap might be shared between scientists and end users, whose own biases
and disciplinary screens might consciously or unconsciously shield them from the implications of relevant scientific
research. Similar factors might prevent end users from making key research needs known to environmental scientists.
37
38
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match between the scientific world … and the management world.” 43 Thus, they claim,
stakeholders can play a key role in driving the ecological research agenda, and in translating
research generated by scientists into policy.
Second, ecology is only one of many disciplines in the broader realm of environmental
science, all of which contribute knowledge and understanding relevant to environmental policy. 44
Those include chemistry, hydrology, political science, medicine “and other disciplines that could
mitigate the negative effects of human activities and sustain natural systems.” 45 The term
“translational ecology” took hold in the scientific community so quickly that the term itself has
not been broadened (for example, to “translational environmental science”). 46 The proposed
methodology, however, has now embraced a broader range of scientific disciplines related to the
environment than ecology alone.47
Third, scholars subsequently offered somewhat broader definitions of translational ecology
than Schlesinger first proposed. Brunson and Baker, for example, suggested:
Translational ecology is boundary-spanning environmental science that leads to actionable
research focused on maintaining or enhancing the resilience of social-ecological systems.
Using an adaptive and iterative mode of inquiry, it extends beyond traditional scientific
boundaries. It provides accessible tools and frameworks that allow exchanges of
knowledge among ecologists and intended beneficiaries of their science, to promote mutual
learning and a shared sense of its utility. 48

Because the goal of proponents of translational ecology is to improve practices within their own disciplines, it was
perhaps appropriate for them to accept responsibility for their own contribution to the science-policy gap rather than
deferring part of the responsibility to others.
43 Carolyn A.F. Enquist, et al., Foundations of Translational Ecology, 15 FRONTIERS OF ECOL. & THE ENV’T., 541,
545 (2017).
44 Brunson & Baker, supra note 35, at 295.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 296.
47 Although the lay public often considers the term “ecology” as synonymous with environmental sciences more
generally, ecology is the science exploring the relationships between organisms and their environment, including
patterns of abundance and distribution, and the flow of energy and materials through ecosystems. See Cary Inst. Of
Ecosystem Studies, Definition of Ecology, available at https://www.caryinstitute.org/discover-ecology/definitionecology (presenting multiple definitions of ecology).
48 Brunson & Baker, supra note 35, at 297. A convened group of ecologists, social scientists, and conservation
professionals at the University of California-Santa Barbara later modified this definition further to “an approach that
embodies intentional processes in which ecologists, stakeholders, and decision makers work collaboratively to develop
ecological research via joint consideration of the sociological, ecological, and political contexts of an environmental
problem that ideally results in improved environment-related decision making.” Enquist, et al., supra note 43, at 542
Panel 1, 544. This definition drops any specific substantive goal in favor of the more procedural objective of improved
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This more explicitly calls for scientific research that is “actionable” and proposed a substantive
goal of the resilience of social-ecological systems49 to Schlesinger’s largely procedural definition.
Enquist et al. (in a group that also included Brunson) returned to a definition focused on a
process leading to better decisions than a particular substantive goal:
Translational ecology: an approach that embodies intentional processes in which
ecologists, stakeholders, and decision makers work collaboratively, to develop ecological
research via joint consideration of the sociological, ecological, and political contexts of an
environmental problem that ideally results in improved environment-related decision
making.50
This group also articulated the end goal as “social and environmental sustainability,” however,
recognizing the “coupled nature of social and ecological systems.” 51 Yet another overlapping
group researchers defined a translational ecologist as “a professional ecologist who engages
across social, professional, and disciplinary boundaries in order to achieve practical
environmental solutions to primary challenges.”52 The definition offered by this group falls
somewhere in between, embracing the general goal of “practical environmental solutions”
without establishing any particular substantive standard. Yet the analysis in the article also
articulates the general goal of a “healthy environment.” 53
Thus, in its nascent and rapidly evolving period, practitioners of translational ecology are
struggling with the issue of whether the practice should have a substantive goal or a purely
procedural objective of fostering better-informed environmental decisions. Ultimately, it seems
most likely that the practice will settle on more procedural than particular substantive goals, with
the trust that better process will lead to better decisions. Any other goal might challenge the
objectivity that remains critical to the scientific process.54 Moreover, one of the main reasons

decision making, under the postulate that “ecologically informed management and policy decisions are better
decisions.” Id. at 543.
49 The convened group later articulated the end goal as “social and environmental sustainability,” recognizing the
“coupled nature of social and ecological systems.” See id.
50 Enquist, et al., supra note 43, at 542, Panel 1. This group later articulated the end goal as “social and environmental
sustainability,” recognizing the “coupled nature of social and ecological systems.” See Enquist, et al., supra note 39,
at 541, 543.
51 See id. at 541, 543.
52 Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 587, 588.
53 See id. at 588.
54 See Enquist et al., supra note 43, at 545.
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translational ecologists embrace collaborative process is the recognition that environmental
problems involve competing value choices by diverse stakeholders,55 and that scientists need to
be mindful of the distinction between science and personal values.56
Fourth, researchers have worked toward concrete practical steps to operationalize the idea
of translational ecology. They have proposed development of a curriculum for graduate students
to train them in the knowledge, skills, and attributes needed to practice transactional ecology.57
They urge existing and new scientists to overcome incentives in academia to conduct purely
theoretical research to obtain research funding and to move through the tenure track and up the
academic ladder, rather than research that also has practical applications. 58 In furtherance of this
goal, researchers are developing lists of core competencies they deem useful to the practice of
translational ecology.59 Other operational tools of translational ecology include more consumable
modes of communicating research results than traditional scientific journal literature, including
web-based dissemination and dialogues via social media or live collaborative processes. 60
Dialogue with stakeholders, they argue, can build trust in the integrity of the science and its
relevance to policy. Given increased politicization of science,61 and recent research on social and
political divides on the extent to which the public trusts scientists, 62 building trust is a key goal. 63
Finally, subsequent researchers explained in more detail that translational ecology must
recognize the “wicked” nature of environmental problems. 64 Iterative collaborations between
scientists and stakeholders are particularly important when decisions need to be made in the face
of incomplete and contradictory information and shifting political and social contexts. 65 Decisions
must take into account the frequent mismatch between information needs and information

See id.
See Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 589. Issues that involve science but cannot be resolved by science alone have
been referred to as “trans-scientific.” See Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).
57 See Brunson & Baker, supra note 35, at 297-98.
58 See id. at 296.
59 See id. at 298 Table 2; Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 588.
60 Enquist, et al., supra note 43, at 548.
61 See Adler, supra note 17, at 2-5.
62 See Pew Research Center, Trust and Mistrust in Americans’ Views of Scientific Experts, August 2019, available
at file:///Users/u0028434/Downloads/PS_08.02.19_trust.in_.scientists_FULLREPORT_8.5.19.pdf.
63 “Trust is a common theme associated with each of the TE principles, and is based on strong communication, frequent
and ongoing engagement, and a commitment to participation throughout the science translation process.” Enquist et
al., supra note 43, at 545.
64 See Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 590.
65 See id.
55
56
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availability, and the mismatch between the time frame and scope of information needed and
information available.66
In sum, the evolving field of translational ecology embraces the following principles: (1)
accurate and understandable communication of environmental science research in ways the users
of that information (“stakeholders”) can readily understand; (2) ongoing partnerships between
environmental scientists and stakeholders, recognizing that solutions to pressing environmental
problems involve values as well as science; (3) ongoing, multi-directional communication between
scientists and stakeholders to build trust and to ensure that scientists engage in research that is
actionable and relevant to important policy decisions and program implementation, and that
recognizes the uncertainty in the information available to address complex environmental
problems; (4) interdisciplinary scientific collaboration to explore connections between the
implications of each field of scientific research to important environmental problems; and, in some
but not all definitions, (5) a substantive goal of research that promotes social and ecological
resilience and sustainability. 67
B. Relationship to Earlier Concepts of the Law-Science Interface
None of the individual concepts of translational ecology identified above are entirely new,
and the field of environmental law has not been blind to those principles. Environmental scientists
have identified other approaches to applied ecology as relevant to environmental and natural
resources law, such as conservation biology,68 adaptive management, 69 and resilience theory. 70
Moreover, natural resource managers have been working for decades on interdisciplinary,
collaborative processes through the rubrics of ecosystem management and watershed
management.71 Although Schlesinger’s seminal editorial advocating for translational ecology
linked the idea to the parallel discipline of translational medicine rather than earlier versions of
applied ecology, subsequent proponents have identified its similarities to conservation biology,
adaptive management, and other practices in applied ecology.72 A preliminary question, then, is
whether translational ecology poses a sufficiently new paradigm to warrant attention. Although a
See Enquist et al., supra note 43, at 545.
One working group categorized the principles of translational ecology as collaboration, engagement, commitment,
communication, process, and decision-framing. See id. at 544.
68 See infra Part II.B.1.
69 See infra Part II.B.2.
70 See infra Part II.B.3.
71 See infra Part II.B.4.
72 See Enquist et al., supra note 43 at 542, 543; Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 591.
66
67
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complete treatment is not possible here, the following explores the main similarities and
differences between these related concepts.
1. Conservation biology
Conservation biology as a recognized discipline dates to the late 1970s,73 and one
prominent conservation biologist cited its “flowering in the mid-1980s with the founding of the
Society for Conservation Biology.”74 It reflected dissatisfaction by some scientists with
“traditional” resource management disciplines focused on maximization of extractive resource
values (such as timber, livestock grazing, wildlife and fisheries) at the expense of biodiversity
conservation and ecosystem protection. 75 Conservation biologists recognized that, like the more
utilitarian resource management disciplines that preceded them, their focus was also “missionoriented”, but guided by a different set of values and priorities.76
Conservation biology shares several attributes with translational ecology. It proposes the
purposeful application of science rather than purely “curiosity-driven” science. It acknowledges
the connection between science and values. Because it requires conservation across broad
geographic regions and affects a wide range of human activities, it is interdisciplinary.77 Its call
for ecosystem protection across political, public-private, and land management agency boundaries
requires collaboration and cooperation.78 Given the complexity and uncertainty of biodiversity
protection, it also embraces principles of iterative adaptive management. 79
There are a number of ways, however, in which conservation biology differs from
translational ecology. Most notably, conservation biology embraces particular substantive goals
rather than viewing science as one tool in making decisions influenced by other values and
disciplines as well. It promotes science to advance biodiversity conservation on a broad scale. 80 It

See, e.g., Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology as they Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.KENT L. REV. 893 (1994); Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911 (1994).
74 See Noss, supra note 73, at 894. For broader perspectives on conservation biology, see generally, Michel E. Soule,
What is Conservation Biology, 35 BIOSCIENCE 727 (1985); CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARYECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Michael E. Soule & Bruce Wilcox, eds. 1980).
75 See Noss, supra note 73, at 894-95.
76 See id. at 895, 899.
77 See id. at 894-95 (identifying the need to include biologists, geographers, sociologists, economists, lawyers, political
scientists, artists, educators, and others).
78 See id. at 907 (calling for “cooperation among agencies and landowners and coordination of inventory, research,
monitoring, and management activities”).
79 See id. at 907; infra Part II.B.4.
80 See Noss, supra note 73, at 894-95.
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embraces a philosophy of conservative resource exploitation in the face of scientific uncertainty
about the potential impacts of human development.81 It reflects the growing realization that
ecosystems are dynamic and unpredictable, and should be managed accordingly.82 It articulates
specific principles of management and reserve design for target species, and ecosystem
management to accomplish its stated goals.83 Although acknowledging the interdisciplinary nature
of environmental decisions, one key conservation biology proponent argued that “biology must
determine the bottom line.”84
Thus, one might characterize conservation biology as advocating substantive goals of
biodiversity conservation and ecosystem protection while using procedural principles
(interdisciplinary collaboration; cooperation across agencies, landownership, and levels of
government) to advance those goals. In short, it is directional. It endorses a set of ecological goals
rather than embracing a process to involve multiple disciplines and stakeholders to achieve
consensus on substantive goals. It assumes those goals to be valid regardless of what society has
determined through existing laws and regulations. As one legal scholar has noted, the law often
runs counter to principles of biodiversity conservation.85 Natural resource management laws
necessarily consider multiple resource goals and values, and balance them against one another,
contrary to the idea advanced by conservation biology that biodiversity preservation should
transcend all other priorities in managing natural resources.86 Although some environmental
statutes advance this goal through absolutist mandates, particularly the Endangered Species Act, 87
on a broader scale the goals of conservation biology would require significant changes in existing
natural resource and environmental law and policy. 88
Although translational ecology and conservation biology share some common elements,
then, translational ecology is conceptualized quite differently. Rather than embracing particular

See id. at 896, 898-99.
See id. at 893.
83 See id. at 900-07.
84 Id. at 899.
85 See Keiter, supra note 73, at 911.
86 See id. at 912.
87 16 U.S.C. § 531 et seq.; see Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (holding that the protective
obligations imposed on federal agencies in the ESA are mandatory and absolute); Amy Sinden, In Defense of
Absolutism: Combatting the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005) .
88 See Keiter, supra note 73, at 912. A quarter century ago, Professor Keiter argued that “the legal system [was] edging.
Slowly yet perceptibly, toward endorsing biological diversity as a key consideration in managing the public domain.”
Id. at 933. Whether or not that was true at the time, it appears that the legal system has not moved much closer to that
goal since then, and arguably it has been moving in the opposite direction in recent years.
81
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substantive goals and using process tools to advance them, translational ecology assumes that
scientists can improve environmental decisions and results through collaborative processes that
involve other disciplines and stakeholders in shaping substantive goals.
2. Adaptive management
Environmental scientists developed adaptive management during roughly the same period
as conservation biology.89 It is premised on the idea that ecosystems are complex, and that it is
difficult to predict the impacts of human activities on the environment.90 To help resource
managers plan and implement restoration, protection, and other management actions that are most
likely to achieve their intended results, adaptive management evaluates the impacts of management
efforts through specifically designed experiments. Adaptive management is “learning by doing,”
but approaches range from trial-and-error, to basing management actions on the best known
information at a single point in time, to a more considered series of “test” management actions
coupled with carefully designed assessment efforts to measure and analyze the actual impacts of
the action.91 Management efforts can then be revised based on the results of the experiments in an
iterative fashion, ideally until satisfactory results are achieved.92
Like conservation biology and translational ecology, adaptive management applies science
in ways that improve the results of resource management efforts, rather than engaging in purely
curiosity-driven of theoretical research. Also like both conservation biology and translational
ecology, adaptive management calls for collaboration between scientists, resource managers, and
other stakeholders. Because adaptive management is an iterative process, it requires bi-directional
communication between scientists and resource managers to design and implement the
experiments to evaluate the effects of the management actions taken. It also requires scientists to

See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).
See C.J. Walters & C.S. Holling, Large-scale Management Experiments and Learning by Doing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060,
2060 (1990).
91 See id. See, also, Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 933,
934-35 (2013) (describing variants on active adaptive management).
92 The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (GCDAMP) is a classic example in which, pursuant to
federal statute, see Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, the Bureau of Reclamation
and other cooperating agencies and scientists have engaged in a series of experiments designed to test the impact of
revised flow patterns from Glen Canyon Dam on the ecosystem of the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon
below. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program,
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/index.html; see, generally, ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER
ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY 137-70 (2007). For another example, see Lance Gunderson &
Stephen S. Light, Adaptive Management and Adaptive Governance in the Everglades Ecosystem, 39 POLICY SCIENCES
323 (2006).
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communicate effectively the results of experiments assessing the impacts of those management
activities. It is not clear, however, that adaptive management seeks a particular substantive goal
aside from improving the understanding and hence the effectiveness of resource management
actions.93 The results of those actions—the definition of “success”—still must be determined
through independent legal or other decision-making process.
Thus, adaptive management resembles translational ecology quite closely, but within a
narrower range of scientific endeavors. Adaptive management involves a specific kind of
collaboration between scientists and resource managers to guide the implementation of particular
resource management activities or programs. It requires effective bidirectional communication and
collaboration but has not developed broad-based academic curricula or training programs to build
an “adaptive management workforce.” Translational ecology encourages scientists on a broader
scale to engage with consumers of scientific information to improve the usefulness of their
scientific research to resource managers and others, and to plan their research agendas to maximize
the relevance of that research. It is also embarking on a comprehensive education program to train
the next generation of environmental scientists to work more closely and effectively with the end
users of their scientific work.
Unlike conservation biology, for which legal scholarship is scarce, legal scholars have
devoted significant attention to the impact of adaptive management on environmental law.94 Some
scholars believe it can be transformative, at least in some contexts.95 Others are somewhat more
skeptical, exploring the limitations of adaptive management 96 and describing its benefits in more
informational terms.97 A key question, then, is whether the idea of translational ecology is
sufficiently broader in scope to suggest more comprehensive shifts in environmental law.
3. Resilience theory
Resilience theory is a more recent and logical extension of the paradigm shift in the science
of ecology that animated both conservation biology and adaptive management. 98 Because
See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 (2011).
For a detailed discussion of much of the literature, see Biber, supra note 91.
95 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 Vand. L.
Rev. 1 (2018) (proposing statutory changes to accommodate adaptive management in administrative law).
96 See, e.g., Biber, supra note 91, at 933-34 (questioning whether adaptive management warrants a “paradigm shift”
in environmental law), 939-56 (exploring the limits of adaptive management); Eric Biber, Craig and Ruhl’s Model
Adaptive Management Act: Some Proposed Amendments, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 257 (2014. )
97 See Doremus, supra note 93.
98 See, generally, BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A
CHANGING WORLD (2006).
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ecosystems are dynamic rather than static, in ways that are not always easy to predict, 99
conservation biology proposed two major management reforms. The first is caution in the face of
uncertainty, essentially arguing for less human disturbance of ecosystems where the impacts of
that development are understood imperfectly. 100 The second, related to the idea of ecosystem
management described in the following subsection, is more holistic efforts to protect ecosystems
on a larger scale, and across ownership and management boundaries. 101 Maintaining the equivalent
of static zoos within limited protected areas does not adequately preserve and protect “nature” in
its dynamic sense. Adaptive management responded to ecosystem uncertainty and change in a
more procedural way, in which careful scientific experimentation is used to guide resource agency
actions and decisions in the face of that uncertainty and dynamism. 102
Resilience theory has taken one step further the ecological concept that ecosystems
undergo continuous change even absent human disturbance. It proposes a shift from the
substantive goal of protecting “the balance of nature,” which implies a static ideal condition, to
one of protecting ecosystem resilience. 103 That suggests maintaining ecosystems not at some
prescribed notion of a “perfect” or “natural” state, which is always influenced by human values,104
but rather in a condition that maintains the natural ability of ecosystems to change. Resilience,
however, suggests that natural change occurs at rates and within bounds that preserve ecosystem
structure and function. It provides a different substantive goal for ecological protection consistent
with the newer paradigm that ecosystems exist in a constant state of flux, but that too much change
or too rapid change can impair ecosystem function.
Resilience theory has profound implications for environmental management and
environmental law, which others have explored extensively. 105 For example, it could suggest a
different way to conceptualize the stated objective of the Clean Water Act to “restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”106 Likewise, it could have

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
101 See id.
102 See supra Part II.B.2.
103 See, e.g., Craig R. Allen, et al., Managing for Resilience, 17 WILDLIFE BIOLOGY 337 (2011).
104 See RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 92, at 79-103.
105 See MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE END OF SUSTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE AND THE FUTURE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE (2017). See, also, Resilience & Environmental Law
Reform Symposium, 87 NEBRASKA L. REV. No. 4 (2009).
106 33 U.S.C. §1251(a); see Robert W. Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and Sustainability: Revisiting the Fundamental
Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. U. J. LAW & POL’Y 139, 142-50 (2010).
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implications for how we interpret to goal of the Endangered Species Act to preserve and protect
threatened and endangered species and “the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend….”107
Unlike translational ecology, however, resilience theory is not a proposed procedural
framework to guide the future training and work of ecologists and other environmental scientists.
It is a new or revised substantive paradigm in the science of ecology, albeit an extremely important
one, and one that might help guide the practice of translational ecology, along with the other factors
and values that the collaborative process of translational ecology might generate.
4. Ecosystem and watershed management
For many decades, resource managers and legal scholars have recognized that effective
natural resource and environmental management cannot be accomplished by focusing in isolation
on individual resources and their associated values (land, air, water, timber, forage, wildlife, etc.),
individual land areas (federal, state, local, private) or water bodies (streams, rivers, lakes, wetlands,
estuaries), or separate management agencies or other interested parties. That realization led to the
development of the fields of ecosystem management108 and watershed management,109 which are
similar practices applied with a different bioregional focus.110
Ecosystem and watershed management resemble translational ecology in their reliance on
collaboration among natural resource and environmental management agencies at multiple
governmental levels, scientists in multiple disciplines, natural resource users, and other
stakeholders. Ecosystem and watershed management programs use those collaborative processes
to set restoration, protection, and management goals for the defined program area based on
16 U.S.C. §1531(b).
See RICHARD O. BROOKS, ROSS JONES & ROSS A. VIRGINIA, LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM
REGIME (2002); J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven Degrees of Relevance, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVT. 156 (Winter 2000); Robert B. Keiter, National Parks, Ecosystem Management, and the Law, 15
J. Energy, Nat. Resources & Envt’l L. 249 (1995); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law
of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994).
109 See Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 Wm. & Mary. J. Envt’l L. & Pol’y 379
(2000); Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watershed and the Integration of U.S. Water Law and Policy: Bridging
the Great Divides, 25 Wm. & Mary. J. Envt’l L. & Pol’y 1 (2000); Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed
Protection, 25 Envt’l L. 973 (1995); William Goldfarb: Watershed Management, Slogan or Solution, 21 Boston Coll.
Envt’l. Aff. L. Rev 483 (1994). For a more comprehensive list, see ROBERT W. ADLER. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, &
NOAH D. HALL, WATER LAW: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 793 (2d ed.
2018).
110 Ecosystem management focuses on terrestrial ecosystems as the relevant geographic area within which to manage
wildlife and other natural resources, although water bodies are components of those ecosystems. Watershed
management focuses on watersheds as the relevant geographic focus within which to manage resources related to
aquatic ecosystem health, although land use is necessarily a component of those efforts.
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multiple factors, including applicable laws and regulations, relevant science, stakeholder input,
and to the extent the applicable law allows, relevant social, economic, and other factors reflecting
community values and needs. 111 Thus, like translational ecology, ecosystem and watershed
management are more procedural than substantive conceptually,112 relying on the process and its
participants to define substantive program goals. As was true for adaptive management, however,
skeptics note that such process reforms can have limitations when political, social, economic or
other non-scientific factors predominate in efforts to resolve divisive environmental issues. 113
Environmental science aids ecosystem and watershed management processes by
monitoring to establish environmental baseline conditions, informing goal-setting by helping to
define healthy and resilient ecological conditions, using adaptive management to evaluate what
actions and practices are likely to achieve those goals, and conducting additional research and
monitoring to assess the degree to which program goals are met. Moreover, ecosystem and
watershed management programs often have specific processes designed to guide appropriate and
action-oriented scientific research agendas. All of this requires effective multi-directional
communication among groups of scientists in different disciplines and between scientists,
decision-makers and stakeholders.
Ecosystem, and watershed management programs, however, differ from translational
ecology in their source, focus, and defined purposes. They are designed and organized not by the
scientific community, but by resource management agencies, community partnerships, or other
diverse entities whose main focus is to improve management and protection of the target
ecosystems or watersheds.114 Scientists are one of many key communities of participants in the
process. Translational ecology is somewhat of a mirror image of those processes, in which the
scientific community engages in communication and collaboration with end users to help define
and ensure the relevance of its research agenda.

See, e.g., Adler (Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection), supra note 109, at 1104-06; Keiter (Beyond the
Boundary Line), supra note 108, at 323-25; BROOKS et al., supra note 108, at 261-79.
112 Neither is entirely procedural, because they each rest on the substantive premise that effective land and water
restoration, protection, and management is best achieved within logical environmentally-defined areas.
113 See James L. Huffman, Comprehensive River Basin Management: The Limits of Collaborative, Stakeholder-Based,
Water Governance, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117 (2009); John D. Echeverria, No Success Like Failure: The Platte River
Collaborative Watershed Planning Process, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 559 (2001) (arguing that the
Platte River watershed process was a waste of time and money); Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience
May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB.
L. REV. 893 (2009) (critiquing Everglades and Grand Canyon watershed-based restoration efforts).
114 See infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of watershed management programs under the Clean Water Act.
111
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This distinction may be narrow and, in some cases potentially semantic, 115 but it can also
be important. Ecosystem and watershed programs are tightly focused on the defined geographic
and programmatic reaches of those efforts, and enlist scientific help in defining, achieving, and
monitoring progress toward program goals. It reflects one way that scientists can use translational
ecology principles to set research goals and to communicate research results both effectively and
usefully. Not all scientists will want to limit their research to particular geographically-defined
programs, however, and might reverse the process to identify broader research efforts that might
help with broader research management and environmental protection programs and goals.
5. What does translational ecology add?
Each of the above concepts of applied ecology share various attributes with the evolving
idea of translational ecology, and with one another. Some are more substantive in nature and others
more procedural. Some are more value laden, beginning with particular environmental goals, and
others rely on a process to define those goals in collaboration with other interested parties. Each,
however, relies to some extent on the core goals of translational ecology to make environmental
science more relevant to ongoing resource management programs and decisions, and to better
translate the results of environmental science into effective and constructive action. It is possible,
then, to critique translational ecology as just another variation on existing themes of applied
ecology. If so, it would not add significantly to the overall goal of improving the role of
environmental science in environmental policy, and environmental law.
There are a number of ways, however, in which translational ecology transcends each of
its predecessors. Conservation biology and resilience theory are both largely substantive ideas
directed at achieving specific environmental results. Each might rely on collaboration with various
end users of science to achieve those results, but they are directional and goal-oriented in nature.
An exercise in translational ecology ultimately might adopt or implement principles of
conservation biology or resilience theory, but the main point of translational ecology is to
collaborate with end users of science to determine what those goals should be in particular
contexts, and to conduct scientific research most relevant and useful to those goals.
Adaptive management, ecosystem management, and watershed management, by contrast,
are more similar to translational ecology in their reliance on collaborative process to help define

For example, scientists might practice translational ecology by engaging with a new or existing ecosystem or
watershed management program.
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substantive program goals. Those programs operate, however, within specific program contexts.
Translational ecology seeks to broaden the idea of collaboration between scientists and end users
with no constraints regarding the geography of focus, or the kinds of environmental programs or
issues involved. In short, it appears to be the broadest conceptualization of applied ecology
identified to date.
Taken as a whole, then, the principles of translational ecology have the potential to advance
the goal of better integration of science, law and policy beyond what previous efforts have
achieved. That necessarily suggests that it has the potential to improve the manner in which
environmental science and environmental law interact. Because translational ecologists recognize
that science is only one of many considerations that drive environmental law and policy, however,
they should also understand that it may face the same kinds of limitations that earlier modes of
applied ecology have faced in resolving politically divisive environmental issues.
III.

Opportunities for Translational Ecology in Environmental Law
Based on the foregoing summary of the principles of translational ecology, 116 it seems

facially apparent that translational ecology has implications for the implementation of
environmental law. Proponents of the practice emphasize the relationship between environmental
science and environmental policy. Some of that analysis identifies law as one of the areas of
knowledge that translational ecologists should understand in order to practice in the field. 117
Science has always been integral to environmental law because scientific research most often is
the source of information identifying environmental problems, helping to define environmental
restoration and protection efforts, and helping to identify solutions and to monitor and assess their
effectiveness.118
That linkage, however, does not identify or explain the actual relationship between
translational ecology and environmental law. Existing environmental statutes might provide
specific opportunities to test or practice translational ecology in the context of new or ongoing
environmental programs. Those opportunities are explored in this Part, using three of the major

See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 10.
118 See, e.g., David E. Adelman, The Art of the Unsolvable: Locating the Vital Center of Science for Environmental
Law and Policy, 37 ENVT’L L. 935, 939-56 (2007); Deborah M. Brosnan, Science, Law, and the Environment: The
Making of a Modern Discipline, 37 ENVT’L L. 987, 993-99, 939-56 (2007).
116
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federal environmental statutes as nonexclusive examples.119 Moreover, the fundamental concepts
and goals of translational ecology suggest that there may be ways in which environmental law and
related aspects of administrative law might evolve to accommodate or facilitate translational
ecology.120 Those issues are explored in Part IV.
A. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) 121 provides good opportunities for translational ecology
because the Act focuses so heavily and fundamentally on ecological integrity.122 Nearly a half
century after Congress adopted this language and its many implementing programs, the agencies
charged with implementing the statute123 still struggle with a number of key definitional and
implementation challenges that implicate ecology and other environmental sciences. Translational
ecology can help address those challenges at three levels of statutory implementation: (1) defining
the scope and goals of the statute; (2) implementing broad statutory programs more robustly and
holistically, with improved focus on the overriding objective of the statute; and (3) restoring and
protecting individual water bodies.
1. Defining the CWA’s Objective and Scope
The opening sentence of the CWA establishes a broad and ambitious national objective
that begs for scientific aid in its interpretation: “The objective of this [Act] is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 124 Interpreting

This is not an exclusive set of examples. Other environmental laws and programs, including applicable common
law, could also suggest opportunities for translational ecology. For example, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, often known as “Superfund”), establishes liability for
“damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources ….” 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(C). Natural resource
damage assessments conducted by government trustees to support such liability claims, see id. §9607(f), require
extensive analysis by environmental scientists to identify and characterize the damage, and collaboration with
economists and others to monetize the damage identified. See State of Ohio v. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing regulations governing natural resource damage assessments).
120 This reciprocal relationship is a further example of what I explored elsewhere as the coevolutionary relationship
between environmental law and science. See Adler, supra note 17; see, also, J.B. Ruhl, Reconstructing the Wall of
Virtue: Maxims for the Co-Evolution of Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 37 ENVTL. L. 1063 (2007).
121 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. The CWA was the example I used in presenting this thesis initially to the Society of
Freshwater Science. See supra note *.
122 See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and
Biological Integrity, 33 ENVT’L L. 29, 32-46 (2003).
123 At the federal level, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has principle responsibility for implementing
the Act, and for overseeing implementation of state responsibilities. See 33 U.S.C. §§1251(d), 1361. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (ACE) has responsibility for one key permitting program, see id. §1344; and states have primary
responsibility for the water quality standards program, see id. §1313(c), and the option of implementing both of the
Act’s key water pollution permitting programs. See id. §§1342(b), 1344(g)-(i).
124 Id. §1251(a).
119
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the meaning of this sentence requires elucidation of at least two key terms. First, what did Congress
mean by “chemical, physical, and biological integrity?” Second, what are the “Nation’s waters”
that are subject to the statutory objective?
a. What is “chemical, physical, and biological integrity?”
Although the CWA contains 25 definitions of its key terms,125 nowhere does the statute
define the word “integrity”, either alone or in the context of the phrase “chemical, physical, and
biological integrity.”126 This is a deceptively difficult issue. For example, although the CWA
includes a subsidiary goal to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the nation’s waters from
external human sources as one means of achieving the Act’s primary objective, 127 “chemical
integrity” cannot mean the absence of chemical substances in water bodies. Entirely unimpaired
rivers, lakes, and other water bodies naturally contain a range of substances that support aquatic
life—or at least do not impair aquatic life in the natural world.128 Moreover, chemical substances
reach water bodies from human and other sources not subject to the zero-discharge goal.129
Scientists have long been a pivotal part of the effort to define water quality standards
dictating levels of chemical constituents in water bodies that may harm aquatic life, human uses,
or other important values. 130 Similarly, aquatic ecologists have developed systems of metrics to
compare impaired water bodies with relatively unimpaired reference systems to measure the
degree to which human change has adversely affected the integrity of the water body, which EPA

33 U.S.C. §1362.
There are explanations in the legislative history of the 1972 CWA that provide some guidance as to what Congress
meant by “integrity”. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-911 at 76-77 (1972) (explaining integrity as “a concept that refers to a
condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is maintained”); S. REP. NO. 92-50 at 12, 15 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3678-79 (indicating that ‘[m]aintenance of such integrity requires that … the
aquatic ecosystem will return to a state functionally identical to the original”). See, also, Adler, supra note 122, at 4446.
127 Id. §§1251(a)(1).
128 See, e.g., DAVID A. CHIN, WATER QUALITY ENGINEERING IN NATURAL SYSTEMS: FATE AND TRANSPORT
PROCESSES IN THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (2013) §§2.1 (describing dissolved oxygen levels necessary to support
aquatic life), 2.3.4 (characterizing nutrients as “essential elements to sustain growth and life function” at acceptable
levels).
129 These include both anthropogenic “nonpoint sources” of pollution, see 33 U.S.C. §1329, infra Part III.A.3, and
natural sources such as erosion and sedimentation and air deposition. See Frank J. Humenik, Michael D. Smolen, &
Steven A. Dressing, Pollution from Nonpoint Sources: Where We Are and Where We Should Go, 21 ENVIRON. SCI.
TECH. 737 (1987); CHIN, supra note 128, §1.2 (2013) (characterizing sources of water pollution).
130 See 33 U.S.C. §§1313(c) (requiring states or EPA to establish water quality standards for water bodies), 1314(a)
(requiring EPA to adopt advisory water quality criteria to guide in the promulgation of legally-effective water quality
standards). EPA has published an extensive set of “water quality criteria documents” discussing the impacts of specific
pollutants on human health and environmental quality. See U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Historical Water Quality Criteria
Documents, available at: https://www.epa.gov/wqc/historical-water-quality-criteria-documents;
125
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and states have used to develop biological water quality criteria, or biocriteria. 131 Indeed, EPA
convened a meeting between agency officials and scientists early in the implementation history of
the CWA,132 which might be characterized as an example of translational science before
Schlesinger had coined the term.
Despite this extensive work on water quality criteria, defining and measuring the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s water bodies is an incomplete and ongoing task 133
that matches the concept of translational ecology well. It is inherently interdisciplinary because
aquatic ecosystem health involves so many different factors studied by a range of scientific
disciplines.134 It is value-laden because zero anthropogenic change is impossible in a modern
world, meaning that EPA and state decisionmakers, with input from other stakeholders, must make
decisions about the degree of impairment to water body integrity is acceptable. 135 That should be
informed by relevant scientific research, and effective bidirectional communication between
scientists, agency officials, and interested members of the public.
b. What are the “Nation’s waters??
Perhaps the most longstanding and bitterly fought dispute regarding CWA statutory
interpretation has involved the fundamental issue of which water bodies are subject to the Act’s
regulatory jurisdiction.136 Unlike the term “integrity”, the CWA’s definitions do attempt to address
this issue,137 but in a way that has confounded both the two federal agencies charged with

See, U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Biological Water Quality Criteria: https://www.epa.gov/wqc/biological-waterquality-criteria; see generally, Adler, supra note 17.
132 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE INTEGRITY OF WATER: A SYMPOSIUM (R. Kent Ballentine & Leonard J.
Guarraia eds. 1977).
133 New forms of water pollution are being discovered continuously. See, e.g., Jennifer Bjorhus, Great Lakes’ Latest
Pollution Threat is Microplastics, The Star Tribune, Aug, 12, 2019, available at: http://www.startribune.com/lakeslatest-pollution-threat-microplastics/535744532/.
134 As just a few examples, aquatic toxicologists study the impacts of contaminants on fish and other aquatic life, while
human toxicologists assess the effects of pollutants on human health due to exposure from fish consumption, drinking
water, or recreational contact. Geomorphologists study the physical and ecological impacts of changes in erosion and
sedimentation due to human development in watersheds. Aquatic ecologists characterize the species composition and
trophic structures of aquatic ecosystems to determine the extent to which they have been modified by human activities
and natural change. Etc.
135 See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding state decisions to allow higher concentrations
of dioxin in water bodies based on different risk choices).
136 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism, Regulatory Architecture, and the Clean Water Rule: Seeking Consensus on the
Waters of the United States, 46 ENVT’L L. 277 (2015). The legal debate regarding the statute’s geographic jurisdiction
dates to just a few years after enactment of the 1972 CWA. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,
392 F.Supp. 695 (D.D.C. 1975) (invalidating ACE’s definition of “waters of the United States” as unduly narrow).
137 See 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas”).
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implementing this aspect of the statute138 as well as the courts. 139 Nearly a half century after
Congress enacted the CWA in its basic current form, 140 the battle over the statute’s geographic
reach remains unresolved.141
The relative extent to which the jurisdictional scope of the CWA is a matter of science or
a matter of law has ebbed and flowed. In its first major effort to construe the jurisdictional reach
of the CWA, Justice White wrote the majority opinion highlighting the role of science in
determining which water bodies were properly subject to the Act’s regulation, bounded by the
language and goals of the Act, and deferring to the sound scientific judgment of the agencies in
interpreting and applying that science:
In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the [Clean Water]
Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise boundaries to regulable waters,
the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent
wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be
defined as waters under the Act. 142
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,143
however, Chief Justice Rehnquist limited the reach of CWA jurisdiction on more purely legal
grounds to exclude non-adjacent wetlands that ACE had found subject to CWA regulation solely
because they provided habitat for migratory birds.144 In doing so, he argued that the word

Although Congress vested primary responsibility for implementing the statute to EPA, see supra note 123, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers implements section 404 of the statute, id. §1344, governing the discharge of dredged and
fill material into jurisdictional waters. Thus, historically the two agencies have tried to speak with one voice regarding
interpretation of the Act’s jurisdictional provisions. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Defense, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Final
Rule, Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (June 29, 2015)
(promulgating joint amended rule).
139 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (generating 4-1-4) split regarding the meaning of “waters of
the United States,” and discussing earlier efforts to construe the provision).
140 The 1972 statute, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), was nominally an amendment to earlier federal water
pollution control legislation, see Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 750, Pub. L. No. 80-85, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948),
but restructured the operation of the law almost entirely. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§4.1A.4.a (2d ed. 1994); ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT
20 YEARS LATER 5-19 (1993).
141 See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Proposed Rule, Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of
the United States—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules” 82 Fed. Reg. 34899 (July 27, 2017) (withdrawing Obama
Administration’s Clean Water Rule and signaling intent to promulgate replacement rule); U.S. Dep’t of Defense, U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Proposed Rule, Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, Feb. 14,
2019; note 139 supra (noting absence of Supreme Court majority on the issue).
142 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985).
143 531 U.S. 539 (2001).
144 Id. at 174.
138
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“navigable” in the CWA must be given some import,145 and that deference to the agency’s legal
and scientific discretion was not appropriate where the agency action “invokes the outer limits of
Congress’ power.”146
In Rapanos v. United States, some members of the Supreme Court went even further in
favoring legal over scientific factors to limit the reach of CWA jurisdiction, or arguably in crafting
their own “scientific” solutions to the problem. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, penned a minority opinion invoking Justice White’s earlier decision to defer
to reasonable executive branch interpretations of legislative intent based on scientific and other
factors.147 Justice Scalia, however, writing for a plurality, determined that the meaning of “waters
of the United States” should be determined by reference to a standard dictionary definition rather
than scientific analysis. 148 He further rejected the agency’s reliance on ecological factors to
delineate waters of the United States except for those waters directly abutting traditional navigable
waters.149 Justice Kennedy, in an opinion concurring in the judgment,150 acknowledged the
scientific basis for ACE’s wetlands delineation manual,151 and critiqued the plurality’s reliance on
dictionary definitions as making “little practical sense.”152 In his effort to reconcile the statutory
text and purpose with the scientific reality that pollution of non-adjacent water bodies can
adversely affect traditional navigable waters, however, Justice Kennedy pronounced a different
test, that CWA jurisdiction requires a “significant nexus” between the water body in question and
navigable waters. 153 Thus, a bare majority of the Court recognized in some way the need to
integrate law and science to ascertain an appropriate interpretation of the CWA’s geographic

Id. at 172.
Id.
147 547 U.S. at 788, 793.
148 Id. at 732-33. Justice Scalia acknowledged that there might be more “scientifically precise” approaches, at least in
the context of ephemeral and intermittent streams, but declined to rely on that science. See id. at 732 n.5.
149 Id. at 741-42.
150 Lower courts have split on whether to apply Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion because it articulated the
narrowest grounds on which the case could be decided under the test established in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977), or the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 208-10 (6th
Cir. 2009) (explaining circuit split but finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue because jurisdiction was proper under
both tests).
151 547 U.S. at 761-62. See, also, id. at 775 (citing Office of Technology Assessment report on relationship between
wetland use and regulation); 777-78 (citing other scientific literature).
152 Id. at 768-70.
153 Id. at 779.
145
146
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scope. Some scientists have subsequently critiqued the “significant nexus” concept, however, as
itself being ungrounded in applicable science. 154
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s divided opinion in Rapanos, EPA convened agency
and other scientists to conduct a comprehensive synthesis of the published scientific literature
describing and explaining the connectivity of streams and wetlands to downstream waters.155 As
explained by one if the report’s authors,156 Dr. Laurie Alexander, the effort was designed to
synthesize the applicable scientific literature with recent case law to support amended agency
rulemaking, and to address stakeholder concerns about the complexity and uncertainty landowners
faced in determining which waters were subject to CWA jurisdiction. 157 Indeed, Alexander
depicted the feedback loops involved in revising CWA regulations in response to evolving case
law and evolving science. 158
The 2015 synthesis report process could be labeled an example of translational ecology,
but it also illustrates the potential limitations of the concept. It involved a multidisciplinary group
of scientists working together and with agency policy officials to help inform the regulatory
process by synthesizing and communicating the applicable science clearly for the public and
agency officials and explaining its relevance to the necessary regulatory decisions.159 It involved

See, e.g., John M. Marton et al., Geographically Isolated Wetlands are Important Biogeographical Reactors on
the Landscape, 65 BIOSCIENCE 408, 408-11 (2015) (explaining geochemical and ecological connections between
isolated wetlands and traditional navigable waters even absent close hydrological connectivity); David M. Mushet et
al., Geographically Isolated Wetlands: Rethinking a Misnomer, 35 Wetlands 423 (2015) (critiquing the scientific
validity of distinguishing between “isolated” and other wetlands in the context of the Rapanos decision).
155 U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 600/R-14/475F, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO
DOWNSTREAM WATERS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (January 2015) (hereinafter
“SYNTHESIS REPORT”).
156 See id. at xiii.
157 Laurie B. Alexander, Science at the Boundaries: Scientific Support for the Clean Water Rule, 34 FRESHWATER
SCIENCE 1588 (2015).
158 See id. at 1589 Fig. 1. See, also, Robert W. Adler, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s New Waters of the
Unted States Rule: Connecting Law and Science, 34 FRESHWATER SCIENCE 1588 (2015) (explaining the manner in
which the Obama Administration’s Clean Water Rule, supported by the SYNTHESIS REPORT, addressed the “significant
nexus” test endorsed by Justice Kennedy and other aspects of the Supreme Court’s decisions).
159 See SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 155, at xiii-xviii (identifying involved scientists); Alexander, supra note 134,
at 1590; 80 Fed. Reg. at 37057 (explaining use of the SYNTHESIS REPORT in developing the amended rule). Because
the purpose of the SYNTHESIS REPORT was to evaluate the existing scientific literature rather than to generate new
science, this process per se did not help scientists develop future research agendas, as envisioned by the idea of
translational ecology. It is clear, however, that aquatic ecologists and other scientists interested in this issue had, for
many years, conducted research specifically to respond to earlier judicial decisions on the issue. See, e.g., Joseph F.
Ebersole, et al., Predicting the Occurrence of Cold-Water Patches at Intermittent and Ephemeral Tributary
Confluences with Warm Rivers, 34 FRESHWATER SCIENCE 111, 111-12 (2014) (explaining the relevance of the
research in helping to reduce scientific uncertainty relevant to Rapanos; Mushet et al., supra note 154, at 423-24
(noting that an earlier issue of the journal Wetlands had been catalyzed by the Supreme Court decision in SWANCC).
154
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extensive scientific review and opportunities for public input, including three external peer
reviews, a review by EPA’s Science Advisory Board, and an opportunity for public comment that
generated more than 130,000 comments,160 in addition to the regular public notice and comment
process accompanying the agencies’ rulemaking process.161
Despite these efforts to engage in practices advocated by translational ecologists (whether
intentional or not), it is evident that the synthesis report process failed almost to resolve the
longstanding dispute over the scope of CWA jurisdiction. Interest groups dissatisfied with the
resulting Obama Administration regulation challenged the rule immediately, in multiple courts and
jurisdictions.162 The Trump Administration later withdrew the Obama Administration regulation
and issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend the regulations once again. 163
It may be that the perceived or actual costs and burdens of CWA compliance are too
hefty,164 or the politics of subjecting private landowners to federal regulation of land and water use
that are traditionally state domains 165 are too divisive,166 to expect that an inclusive scientific
process will ever suffice to resolve the issue. Indeed, clearer statutory language may ultimately be
the only viable solution to the problem. 167 It may also be, however, that simply subjecting drafts
of the synthesis report to traditional notice and comment insufficiently involved interested
stakeholders to have expected that it would generate political consensus on such a divisive conflict.
A more inclusive and iterative process that embraces all of the principles of translational ecology,
that involves the full range of interested stakeholders as well as decision makers from the outset
in planning and conducting relevant research, and that communicates the results of that research
clearly, at least has potential to move in the direction of resolving a controversy that is now
approaching its half century anniversary.

See Alexander, supra note 157, at 1590.
See supra note 141 (discussing 2015 rulemaking process).
162 See Adler, supra note 158, at 1595-96 (citing early challenges to amended WOTUS rule); Nat’l Ass’n. of Mfrs. v.
Dept. of Defense, 138 S.Ct. 617 (2018) (holding that judicial jurisdiction over multiple regulatory challenges to rule
was in federal district court).
163 See supra note 141.
164 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (Scalia, J., citing the costs and burdens of CWA compliance).
165 See 33 U.S.C. §§1251(b), (g) (expressing Congress’ recognition of traditional state authority over land and water
policy and management).
166 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 136, at 279-80 (noting the extreme “political dissensus” surrounding adoption of the
Obama Administration WOTUS rule).
167 Arguably, the fundamental error originated in Congress’s decision to begin with the traditional term “navigable
waters” and then to redefine that term to mean “waters of the United States” with no clear definition of the latter
term. See supra note 137.
160
161
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2. Implementing CWA Statutory Programs
EPA and state water quality agencies have struggled to implement some of the CWA’s key
regulatory programs, in part due to inadequate understanding of relevant scientific factors.
Significant and relatively swift progress was made in reducing the discharge of pollutants into the
nation’s waters from point sources such as major industries and public sewage treatment plants.168
Those kinds of problems were amenable to engineering solutions to identify the best and most
affordable methods of wastewater treatment technology,169 enforced via the CWA’s strict and
mandatory permitting provisions for point source dischargers. 170 Although the CWA’s point
source controls have not achieved the statute’s zero discharge goal, 171 and the Act calls for ongoing
revisions to technology-based standards in pursuit of that goal, 172 the engineering science needed
to do so is relatively clear and focused: what new or improved treatment methods or industrial
process changes are available or need to be developed to further reduce or eliminate discharges
from particular kinds of industry?
Despite progress in reducing point source pollution, a large percentage of the Nation’s
waters remain chemically, physically, or biologically impaired. 173 In addition to remaining point
source discharges, this remaining pollution derives largely from the runoff of large amounts of
additional pollutants from so-called “nonpoint sources,”174 as well as additional “pollution”175

See ADLER, LANDMAN & CAMERON, supra note 140, at 14-18; Robert W. Adler, The Decline and (Possible)
Renewal of Aspiration in the Clean Water Act, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 759, 776-77 (2013).
169 EPA’s adopted “best technology” standards known as secondary treatment for municipal sewage point sources, 40
C.F.R. Pt. 133. EPA has also adopted best technology treatment standards for various categories of industrial
discharges. Id. Pts. 400 - 471.
170 See 33 U.S.C. §§1311 (prohibiting any discharge of a pollutant absent a valid permit and compliance with
applicable treatment standards); 1342 (providing for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permits for discharges of most pollutants).
171 See id. §1251(a)(1); Adler, supra note 168.
172 See id. §§1311(b) (requiring EPA to revise effluent limitations guidelines “at least annually”); 1316(b) (requiring
EPA to revise technology-based standards for new sources periodically). The reality has been that most of the
technology-based standards have not been revised for decades. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Pts. 405 (guidelines for dairy
products processing last revised in 1995); 406 (guidelines for grain mills last revised in 1995); 408 (guidelines for
seafood processing last revised in 1995).
173 See Adler, supra note 168, at 777-79.
174 The CWA does not define the term “nonpoint source” separately, leaving its meaning to be deduced by negative
implication. Any source of pollutant release into the Nation’s waters other than a point source is a nonpoint source.
Examples include dispersed runoff from farms, construction sites, etc., so long as those pollutants are not collected or
channelized into a point source before being released into a water body. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for the
Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between channelized and un-channelized
discharges of pollutants from manure spreading).
175 The CWA distinguishes between adverse impacts caused by the discharge of pollutants, which are redressed by the
Act’s point source control provisions, see supra note 169 and accompanying text, and the broader impacts of those
168
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from causes such as loss or impairment of wetlands and other aquatic habitat; loss of riparian
vegetation and other habitat; the impacts of dams, impoundments, stream channelization and other
forms of hydromodification; the hydrologic impacts of increased construction, paving, and other
impervious surfaces in watersheds; and the impacts of invasive species. 176
One likely cause of this failure was congressional failure to adopt stricter control programs
for other pollution sources relative to those that apply to point sources, but legislative changes to
correct that deficiency are politically unlikely. Absent such changes, this is a key opportunity for
translational ecology to help inform better implementation of some of the existing statutory
programs designed to identify and redress those problems. At least three key CWA programs
provide opportunities for translational ecology to contribute to progress in this area.
a. Nonpoint source pollution control
In both 1972 and 1987, Congress adopted separate provisions of the CWA to redress
nonpoint source pollution through state nonpoint source management programs. 177 Although the
degree to which nonpoint sources contribute to water pollution has been known at least since the
1972 version of the CWA,178 implementation of the state nonpoint source planning and
management process has been slow and often less effective than needed. 179 Improved nonpoint
source management efforts require scientific assistance to identify nonpoint pollution sources, 180
develop and evaluate the efficacy of available control methods, 181 and conduct ongoing monitoring
and assessment to improve programs over time. Consistent with the concept of translational
ecology, the statute embraces the use of external expertise 182 and public and intergovernmental
engagement and coordination to maximize the involvement and buy-in of interested
stakeholders.183
and other forms of water “pollution”, defined as “the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical,
biological, and radiological integrity of water.” 33 U.S.C. §1362(19).
176 See Robert W. Adler, Fresh Water, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 197, 212-15 (John c. Dernbach, ed.
2002).
177 See 33 U.S.C. §§1288, 1329; Pub. L. 100-4, §316(a), 101 Stat. 52 (Feb. 4, 1987), adding 33 U.S.C. §1329.
178 See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3705; ADLER, LANDMAN & CAMERON, supra
note 140, at 171-73. The 1972 statute attempted to address nonpoint source pollution through comprehensive state
water pollution control plans, see id. §1288. Congress added the more specific provision in 1987 due to the absence
of sufficient progress under the earlier provision. See Robert W. Adler, Water Quality and Agriculture: Assessing
Alternative Futures, 25 ENVIRONS 77, 79-80 (2002).
179 See Adler, supra note 178.
180 33 U.S.C. §1329(a)(1)B).
181 Id. §1329(a)(1)(D).
182 Id. §1329(b)(3).
183 Id. §1329(a)(1)(C).
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Nonpoint source pollution control efforts have been divisive because they implicate and
potentially regulate or otherwise affect184 the actions of a wide range of landowners and land users
whose land uses may impair water bodies. As is true of the definition of “waters of the United
States,” federal legislation governing land and water use is politically controversial. 185 Small
farmers and other landowners are not always inclined to accept information from environmental
scientists that may impair their livelihoods and ways of life,186 particularly given the recent
research regarding the degree to which shows that political views influence trust in science. 187 No
single effort is likely to eliminate the longstanding political resistance to nonpoint source pollution
control. Nevertheless, efforts by translational ecologists to involve landowners (as well as state
and local water pollution control and land use planning officials) directly in research planning, and
to communicate research results effectively, could help generate increased trust and therefore
increased willingness to adopt management practices to reduce nonpoint source pollution impacts.
b. Total maximum daily loads
In addition to other comprehensive water pollution control planning provisions in the
CWA,188 the CWA includes a specific provision designed to account for—and allocate control
obligations among—all sources contributing to water quality standards (WQS) violations in a
particular water body or water body segment. 189 The Act requires states or EPA to identify all
water bodies for which technology-based controls alone are not sufficient to attain applicable
WQS,190 and then to calculate the total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) of pollutants the water
body can accommodate without exceeding WQS under the range of hydrologic conditions
expected in the watershed. 191 The TMDL process and other provisions of the CWA192 then require

Unlike the point source control provisions of the CWA, section 319 does not mandate state regulation of nonpoint
sources; nor does it authorize EPA to adopt stricter control provisions where state programs fail to address nonpoint
source pollution problems. Rather states, are free to choose whatever regulatory or nonregulatory mechanism they
believe are appropriate to address particular nonpoint sources. See id. §1329(b).
185 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
186 See Hanna L. Breetz et al., Trust and Communication: Mechanisms for Increasing Farmers’ Participation in Water
Quality Trading, 81 LAND ECONOMICS 170 (2005).
187 See supra note 62.
188 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§1288, 1313(d).
189 Id. §1313(d).
190 Id. §1313(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B).
191 Id. §1313(d)(1)(C), (d)(1)(D).
192 Id. §1311(b)(1)(C).
184
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states to impose additional control requirements on the responsible pollution sources which, in the
aggregate, will result in WQS attainment. 193
Although the TMDL process may appear to be a matter of simple arithmetic, 194 it is fraught
with scientific complexities. Uncertainties include temporal and geographic variability in pollutant
loads from individual sources, 195 variables affecting the transport and fate of pollutants once in the
aquatic system,196 and variability in hydrology within seasonal, annual, or longer time periods. 197
Scientists have developed a variety of computer models designed to predict the relationship
between pollutant discharges and WQS attainment in the face of all of those variables.198
The TMDL process becomes even more complex and uncertain for pollution sources other
than the release of discrete pollutants, as is the process of allocating control obligations among the
sources of that pollution, which involves both scientific and non-scientific factors. For example, if
the temperature of a water body exceeds the applicable WQS due to thermal discharges from
water-cooled electric power plants or other sources that release pollutants with elevated
temperatures, a TMDL can allocate control responsibilities by defining necessary temperature
limits on those discharges.199 If stream temperatures increase due to the loss of riparian vegetative
cover, however, scientists must study the relationship between vegetative shade and water
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4; 130.7; Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. EPA, 504 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied by
Carlotta Copper Co. v. Friends of Pinto Creek, 55 U.S. 1097 (2009); Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9 th Cir.
2002); see, generally, OLIVER HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 2002)..
194 At the simplest level, a TMDL is the sum of all of the point source contributions to a water body segment of a
particular pollutant, plus the sum of all nonpoint source inputs of the same pollutant, plus all of the natural background
load or inputs of that pollutant, plus any allocation reserved for additional pollutants from future growth, plus any
margin of safety determined necessary to account for scientific uncertainty or to be conservative about WQS
attainment. EPA expresses this as a simple equation. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Overview of Total Maximum Daily
Loads (TMDLs), https://www.epa.gov/tmdl/overview-total-maximum-daily-loads-tmdls.
195 Industrial discharges may vary with production levels, inputs used, and other factors; municipal discharges may
vary with population; and nonpoint source inputs vary with precipitation magnitude and intensity.
196 For example, some pollutants change or interact chemically or biologically over time, others volatilize into the air,
and others may precipitate into the sediment, or be re-released into the water body from sediment. See, generally,
CHIN, supra note 128, ch.3.
197 Larger flows increase the loads of pollutants a water body can receive before violating WQS, known as
“assimilative capacity.” See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Guidelines for Reviewing TMDLs under Existing Regulations
Issued
in
1992,
available
at:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201510/documents/2002_06_04_tmdl_guidance_final52002.pdf. Hydrology naturally varies over wet and dry seasons,
within those seasons. Regions also experience periods of drought or relatively high precipitation, factors likely to
become more variably still given climate change. See, e.g., P.C.D. Milly et al., Global Patterns of Trends in
Streamflow and Water Availability in a Changing Climate, 438 NATURE 347 (2005).
198 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 841B-97-006, COMPENDIUM OF TOOLS FOR WATERSHED ASSESSMENT AND
TMDL
DEVELOPMENT
(1997),
available
at:
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/20004NX4.PDF?Dockey=20004NX4.PDF.
199 See 33 U.S.C. §§1313(d)(1)(B), (d)(1)(D); 40 C.F.R. §130.7(c)(2).
193
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temperatures, and perhaps determine how much replanting is necessary to restore stream
temperatures to acceptable levels. Likewise, if natural assemblages of fish and other aquatic
organisms are altered or depleted due to factors other than chemical pollutants, such as lost or
impaired riparian wetland or floodplain habitat, 200 scientists must work with agency officials and
other stakeholders to ascertain what sources or combinations of sources of impairment contribute
to the problem, and what remedial measures might suffice to restore aquatic ecosystem health.
Working on those issues for particular water bodies with identified WQS violations, in
collaboration with landowners and agency officials, provide excellent opportunities for
translational ecology.
The TMDL process, moreover, is a zero-sum game, further suggesting the applicability of
translational ecology. The manner in which the TMDL allocates control obligations among
pollution sources is partly a matter of science and partly a matter of value judgments. 201 This
control allocation challenge is exacerbated when identified WQS impairments derive from large
numbers of dispersed nonpoint sources. That raises the same issues of trust as suggested for the
nonpoint source management program, 202 and suggests the potential utility of efforts by scientists
to collaborate with landowners and agency officials as they develop and communicate research
designed to identify appropriate remedial actions in the TMDL program.
3. Implementing Water Body Restoration and Protection Programs
A third area of opportunity for the application of translational ecology to the CWA is in
helping to inform and assess implementation of the many water body-specific restoration and
protection programs in the statute. Those include the Chesapeake Bay Program, 203 the Great Lakes
Program,204 the Long Island Sound Program, 205 the Lake Champlain Program, 206 and the National

See supra note 176.
Nothing in the CWA or in EPA’s regulations dictate how states must allocate pollutant loads or other pollution
sources among those who contribute to the problem, so long as all pollutant sources are included and the TMDL
provides for attainment of the WQS. See 40 C.F.R. §130.7(c)(1) (stating only that states must develop TMDLs “at
levels necessary to attain and maintain the applicable narrative and numeric WQS with seasonal variations and a
margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent
limitations and water quality”).
202 See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
203 33 U.S.C. §1267.
204 Id. §1268.
205 Id. §1269.
206 Id. §1270.
200
201
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Estuary Program,207 as well as the panoply of other watershed restoration and protection programs
that have developed at various levels of size, organization, and management. 208
In some respects, using translational ecology in the context of individual water body
restoration and protection programs seems less significant than helping to define the scope and
objectives of the entire statute. In other respects, however, translational ecology is perfectly suited
to individual water body programs. Unlike the Clean Air Act, which authorizes and requires EPA
to establish a single national set of ambient air quality standards for the nation, 209 Congress
recognized in the CWA that different aquatic ecosystems may require different water quality
standards and different restoration and protection goals, charging states to adopt water quality
standards (WQS) for different water bodies 210 based on national guidance documents issued by
EPA.211 Thus, scientific research agendas specific to individual water bodies and watersheds are
critical to identifying specific restoration and protection goals, identifying the sources of individual
watershed impairment and reasons for aquatic ecosystem degradation, and planning and
monitoring the effectiveness of remediation efforts.
In this regard, watershed restoration and protection programs are conceptually consistent
with translational ecology. Watershed programs typically involve all relevant stakeholders (water
body users, other local residents, land users and others who may impair watershed uses and values,
responsible agency officials and political leaders, and scientists and other experts) in efforts to set
program goals, design and implement remediation actions, monitor program implementation and
effectiveness, and reiterate the process in a continuous effort to improve results. It is but a short
paddle stroke for practitioners of translational ecology to engage with existing or new watershed

Id. §1330.
Other large watershed programs have developed to address a range of aquatic ecosystem health problems, such as
the program to restore the Sacramento-San Joaquim River Delta that feeds into San Francisco Bay, now under the
auspices of the Delta Stewardship Council, see https://deltacouncil.ca.gov/; and the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive
Management Program administered pursuant to the Grand Canyon Protection Act, Pub. L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4669 et
seq., Oct. 30, 1992, by the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, see
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/phoenix/AZ100/1990/grand_canyon_protection_act_1992.html. Other watershed and water
body-specific programs, however, have developed to restore and protect everything from local streams to larger
watersheds. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Healthy Watersheds Protection, https://www.epa.gov/hwp/healthywatersheds-projects-your-state-and-region (providing database of watershed protection efforts by state).
209 42 U.S.C. §7409. Uniform nationwide air quality standards make sense because human susceptibility to the adverse
health effects of air pollution does not vary significantly with location. But see James E. Krier, The Irrational National
Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974-1975) (arguing that uniform
national standards do not promote rational resource allocation).
210 33 U.S.C. §1313(c); see 40 C.F.R. §§131.6, 131.10, 131.11.
211 33 U.S.C. §1314(a); see 40 C.F.R. §131.11(b).
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protection programs as a way to achieve all of the goals of the practice: working with the end users
of their science to identify relevant and action-oriented research agendas, communicating the
results of their research in ways that directly aid in program implementation and reiterating the
process as needed, and building a relationship of trust between scientists and stakeholders.
Moreover, in the CWA’s various water body protection programs Congress provided for
many of the same attributes as advocated by the proponents of translational ecology. Watershed
programs focus on holistic ecosystem restoration and protection goals.212 They are necessarily
interdisciplinary.213 They rely on extensive stakeholder participation and collaboration. 214 Most
importantly, they specifically provide for extensive involvement by scientists in achieving
program goals through a coordinated process that requires ongoing and effective communication
and collaboration.215 Specific statutory authority is not necessary to establish similar efforts in
other watersheds, as evidenced by the history of effective collaborative watershed programs
around the country.216 All effective watershed programs provide a mechanism for effective
communication and collaboration between involved scientists and other stakeholders. 217
B. The National Environmental Policy Act
Like the CWA, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) begins with broad
statements of ecological objectives, suggesting opportunities for the application of translational
ecology. The opening provision of NEPA establishes as the law’s purposes:
[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;

See 33 U.S.C. §§1267(a)(3), (g) (ecosystem restoration scope of Chesapeake Bay Programs); 1268(a)(3)(C), (I),
(4) (calling for ecosystem-based, lake wide management plans for the Great Lakes); 1269(c)(1) (calling for
comprehensive conservation and management plan for Long Island Sound); 1270(e) (requiring comprehensive
pollution prevention, control, and restoration plan for Lake Champlain).
213 See id. §§1267(g)(1) (Chesapeake Bay); 1269(c)(2) (Long Island Sound).
214 See id. §§1267(b)(2(B)(v) (Chesapeake Bay); 1269(c)(8), (d)(3) (Long Island Sound); 1270(b) (Lake Champlain).
215 See id. §§1267(b)(2), (d), (e), (h)(i) (Chesapeake Bay); 1268(d) (Great Lakes); 1270(c), (d) (Lake Champlain).
216 See supra note 209.
217 See, e.g., http://www.chesapeake.org/stac/ (describing role of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee in
the Chesapeake Bay Program); https://www.glri.us/node/39
(describing the Science and Information Subcommittee of the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative);
https://deltacouncil.ca.gov/delta-science-program/ (describing the Delta Science Program component of the Delta
Stewardship Council); https://www.usgs.gov/centers/sbsc/gcmrc (describing efforts of the U.S. Geological Survey’s
Grand Canyon Research and Monitoring Center to help monitor and implement the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive
Management Program).
212
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[and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources
important to the Nation….218
Congress also declared a national environmental policy to “create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony” for the benefit of current and future
generations, through cooperation with state and local governments as well as other public and
private organizations, 219 along with a series of somewhat more specific environmental goals. 220
Research on how to define and achieve these lofty goals alone provides an ambitious
scientific research agenda for environmental scientists. Moreover, NEPA as initially drafted
provided significant statutory support for the kinds of collaborative science envisioned by
translational ecology, although some of the relevant provisions have since been terminated or are
no longer being implemented fully. For example, although Congress assigned principle
responsibility for implementing the statute’s policies and purposes to agencies of the federal
government, NEPA also recognizes the value of partnerships with other levels of government and
“other concerned public and private organizations,”221 a collaborative focus mirrored by
translational ecology. NEPA initially included a provision mandating the scientific study and
reporting of long-term environmental conditions and trends;222 and a provision for consultation
with a presidentially-created Citizens’ Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality comprised
of the kinds of end users and stakeholders identified by translational ecologists.223
Taken alone, however, the kind of environmental science suggested by these provisions
would not necessarily be “actionable” in the sense intended by Schlesinger and his successors in
defining the goals of translational ecology. The greater opportunity for translational ecology is in

42 U.S.C. §4321. The final purpose articulated in this provision, not relevant here, was to “establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.” Id.
219 Id. §4331(a).
220 These include responsibilities to future generations; “safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically pleasing
surroundings” for all Americans; provision of beneficial environmental uses without undue environmental
degradation, human health or safety risks, or other unintended consequences; preservation of important elements of
our historic, cultural, and natural heritage; a sustainable balance between population and resource use; and
enhancement of the quality of renewable resources through recycling and other measures. Id. §4331(b)(1)-(6).
221 Id. §4331(a).
222 Id. §4344. As part of a more comprehensive effort to reduce federal agency reporting obligations, Congress
terminated this requirement effective May 15, 2000. Pub. L. No. 104-66, §3003, 109 Stat. 734-35 (Dec. 21, 1995).
See, also, 42 U.S.C. §4363 (requiring EPA to conduct long-term environmental research and development).
223 42 U.S.C. §4345 (requiring consultation with existing committee including representatives of science, industry,
agriculture, labor, conservation organizations, state and local governments, and others). This Committee was
terminated in 1977. See Exec. Order No, 12,007, Aug. 12, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 42839. See, also, 42 U.S.C. §4365
(requiring EPA to establish and maintain a Science Advisory Board).
218

35
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3451593

its potential to further NEPA’s pivotal operative provision, which requires all federal agencies to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for every “recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment….”224 Those statements must identify and evaluate the environmental impacts
of the proposed action, any unavoidable adverse environmental effects of the action, alternatives
to the proposed action, the relationship between short-term environmental uses and long-term
environmental productivity, and any “irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources” that
will result from the proposed action. 225
As explained by the courts, although NEPA’s EIS requirement does not mandate any
particular substantive decisions or results, it does require federal agencies to evaluate carefully the
environmental impacts of their proposals and to integrate that information into agency decisions. 226
This ensures that federal agencies consider environmental information and values so they are not
ignored in the fulfillment of the many other agency missions defined by Congress (such as building
and maintaining roads and other infrastructure, operating federal aid programs, managing public
lands and waters, etc.).227
Thus, the EIS requirement is fundamentally an exercise in predictive environmental
science, and environmental scientists are necessarily deeply involved in the NEPA process.228 It
involves both adequate historical research and analysis to define the baseline environmental
conditions against which changes should be measured,229 and predictive modeling and analysis.230
This effort is immensely challenging given the wide range of federal agency actions subject to the
EIS mandate, the even broader array of potential environmental impacts those actions might

Id. §4331(2)(C).
Id. §4331(2)(C)(i)-(v). The President’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has issued regulations governing
the substance and procedure of agency NEPA compliance. See 40 C.F.R. Pts.1500-1508. Each federal agency is
required to promulgate its own procedures, as necessary, to ensure compliance with NEPA and the CEQ regulations.
See id. §§1505.1; 1507.3.
226 See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008); Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
227 See Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Oklahoma, 426 U.S. 776, 787-88, reh’g denied, 429
U.S. 875 (1976).
228 See Mathew Cashmore, The Role of Science in Environmental Impact Assessment: Process and Procedure Versus
Purpose in the Development of Theory, 24 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 403 (2004).
229 See 40 C.F.R. §1502.15.
230 See Bradley Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 344 (2004) (noting that NEPA analysis is
largely predictive).
224
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cause,231 and the inherent uncertainty of predicting future impacts from actions not yet taken. After
all, it is usually difficult to make predictions, especially about the future. 232
This level of difficulty in implementing NEPA’s predictive inquiry has generated a certain
amount of cynicism on all sides of the environmental spectrum. 233 Environmental advocates and
some academics bemoan the fact that NEPA’s process does not presumptively or prescriptively
mandate better environmental results. 234 Critics on the pro-development side of the spectrum argue
that NEPA serves no purpose other than to delay valuable projects and other agency actions and
decisions, with little or no discernible environmental benefits,235 prompting frequent calls for
NEPA reform.236 Agency officials may feel inundated by the challenges and burdens of NEPA or
feel that it distracts them from their primary agency missions.237
Because of its collaborative, trust-building focus, translational ecology might have
potential to overcome at least some of this cynicism and criticism. The CEQ regulations focus
repeatedly on the need for adequate, high quality science to support the NEPA process.238 Other
aspects of the CEQ regulations mirror the philosophy and attributes of translational ecology. For
example, they urge agencies to focus on information and analysis that is useful and actionable,
rather than excessive focus on details with little significance to agency decisions. 239 The rules
counsel agencies to prepare impact statements that communicate the relevant environmental and
other scientific information clearly and concisely, in language understandable to end users.240 CEQ
encourages a systematic and interdisciplinary approach 241 requiring frequent consultation and

NEPA requires analysis of both the direct and indirect environmental impacts of proposed federal agency actions,
including impacts caused by induced growth. See 40 C.F.R. §§1502.16(a), (b); 1508.8.
232 This quip is often attributed to N.Y. Yankee great and major league manager Yogi Berra. See Wikiquote, Yogi
Berra, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Yogi_Berra. However, it can be traced back at least to Danish physicist Niels
Bohr and is derived from an old Danish proverb. See Quote Investigator, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/nopredict/.
233 See Karkkainen, supra note 230, at 338-43.
234 See id. at 342-43.
235 See id. at 340-41.
236 For a description of the most recent such effort at the administrative level, see Valeri Volcovici, Trump
Administration Readies Plan to Speed Environmental Permitting, Reuters, May 22, 2019, available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-environment-regulation/trump-administration-readies-draft-plan-to-speedenvironmental-permitting-idUSKCN1SS2WP.
237 See Karkkainen, supra note 230, at 341-42.
238 See 40 C.F.R. §§1500.1(b) (calling for “high quality information” and “accurate” scientific information); 1502.24
(requiring agencies to ensure the scientific integrity of information in impact statements); 1506.5(a) (requiring
agencies to independently verify information provided by applicants or other sources).
239 See id. §§1500.1(b); 1500.2(b); 1500.4(b); 1501.1(d); 1501.7(a)(3); 1502.2(a), (b).
240 See id. §§1500.2(b); 1500.4 (d); 1502.2(a); 1502.8.
241 See id. §§1501.2(a); 1502.6;
231
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collaboration,242 as well as outreach to and participation by all affected groups and individuals. 243
The NEPA scoping process is designed to identify which impacts and issues are most important
for study and analysis,244 similar to translational ecology’s call for consultation on the most useful
and relevant scientific research agendas.
Recently, CEQ has actively promoted the concept of “collaborative NEPA,” recognizing
that despite NEPA’s collaborative intent “the full potential for more actively identifying and
engaging other Federal, Tribal, State and local agencies, affected and interested parties, and the
public at large in collaborative environmental analysis and federal decision-making is rarely
realized.”245 Other agencies and entities have followed suit,246 although it is not clear how often
agencies have followed the collaborative approach proposed in the CEQ handbook. Although the
CEQ collaboration handbook is aimed at federal agencies implementing the statute, it provides a
clear opportunity for scientists to engage more fully in the EIS process.
Despite these trends, however, several aspects of NEPA have been particularly challenging
in ways that suggest more specific opportunities for using translational ecology to improve
statutory implementation and effectiveness, and to enhance the role of environmental scientists in
the NEPA process. Those opportunities are identified and discussed below.
1. The timing of environmental impact analysis
One key issue that has plagued the environmental impact process has been the proper
timing of an EIS. The threshold inquiry of whether an EIS is required for a particular agency
action247 is a mixed question of science and judgment in determining which impacts are likely and
whether they might “significantly” affect the human environment.248 A related question, however,
See id. §§1501.1(b); 1501.2(d)(2); 1501.6; 1501.7(a)(1); 1502.19(a).
See id. §§1502.19; 1503.1; 1503.4; 1503.3(d); 1506.6.
244 See id. §§1500.4(b); 1501.1(d); 1501.7.
245 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, COLLABORATION IN NEPA, A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 1
(2007), available at: https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/CEQ_Collaboration_in_NEPA_10-2007.pdf.
246 See, e.g., NATIONAL FOREST FOUNDATION, ROADMAP FOR COLLABORATION BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE
NEPA PROCESS (2013), available at: https://www.nationalforests.org/assets/files/Roadmap-for-Collaboration-BeforeDuring-and-After-the-NEPA-Process_NFF.pdf (developed in partnership with the U.S. Forest Service); see, also, P.
Lynn Scarlett, The National Environmental Policy Act: Enhancing Collaboration and Partnerships, Resources (July
2012), available at: https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/the-national-environmental-policy-actenhancing-collaboration-and-partnerships/.
247 An EIS is required when a federal agency makes a proposal for action that may significantly affect the human
environment. See Dept. of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763-64 (2004). Agencies sometimes conduct a
preliminary analysis known as an “environmental assessment” (EA) to determine whether that threshold has been met.
See 40 C.F.R. §§1501.4, 1508.9.
248 See Sierra Club v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (indicating that agencies are
entitled to significant deference in determining whether impacts are significant enough to require an EIS); 40 C.F.R.
242
243
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is when the agency decision is ripe for environmental analysis. If environmental review occurs too
late in an agency’s decision process, the proposal may already have hardened sufficiently that there
is little or no room for the EIS process to alter the agency’s thinking. 249 Therefore, the CEQ
regulations urge agencies to “insure that environmental information is available to public officials
before decisions are made and before actions are taken.” 250 On the other hand, if agencies are
required to initiate the NEPA process too early, the agency may not have developed a proposal
that is likely to be considered seriously, or that has developed sufficiently to allow analysis that is
not too speculative to be helpful. 251
This balance in determining the appropriate timing for environmental review—not to soon
but not too late—makes sense from the perspective of agency decision making and efficiency. It
avoids wasted time and effort on preliminary ideas that do not ultimately move forward,
particularly given typically constrained agency resources. Conversely, it seeks to ensure that
environmental information is available early enough in the decision process to have a meaningful
impact on the agency decision. From a scientific perspective, however, this balance can be
problematic. Good science often takes time, particularly when studying environmental conditions
that vary over time and space, requiring longitudinal monitoring and analysis even to establish a
reasonable baseline with which to compare potential future impacts.
Thus, if an agency waits until a proposal is sufficiently well-formed to warrant an EIS,
preventing potentially wasted agency time and resources, it may be too late to generate sufficient
baseline or predictive scientific information to support a meaningful analysis. If sufficient baseline
and other relevant environmental information is not available by the time a NEPA process begins,
the agency has limited options. It can rely on the CEQ regulatory provision regarding “incomplete
or unavailable information” discussed in the following subsection, 252 or it can attempt to generate
new information quickly enough to support the necessary environmental analysis. The latter course

§§1508.27 (defining “significantly” in terms of human contexts as well as scientific analysis); 1508.14 (defining the
“human environment”).
249 See Amer. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. F.C.C., 516 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
250 40 C.F.R. §1500.1(b). See, also, id. §§1500.5(a), (f); 1501.1(a), (d); 1501.2; 1502.5. Related provisions of the CEQ
regulations cautions agencies not to “commit resources prejudicing selection of alternatives before making a final
decision,” id. §1502.2(f), or to allow actions in advance of the record of decision on the proposal that would have
adverse environmental impacts or limit the choice of reasonable alternatives. Id. §1506.1(a). See, also, id. §1506.10
(prohibiting agency decisions until EIS process and opportunity for public comment is completed).
251 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1976) (requiring an agency “proposal” that is sufficiently ripe
to trigger an EIS).
252 See infra Part III.B.2.
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may generate longer delays in project approval and permitting or in other agency decisions,
potentially generating additional backlash against NEPA. Such constraints might also undermine
trust and confidence in the integrity of the NEPA process.
Proper consultation between academic and other independent scientists practicing
translational ecology and agency officials, project proponents, and concerned environmental
groups might help to bridge this temporal gap. Although the timing and location of development
projects that may be subject to NEPA scrutiny cannot always be predicted with certainty, agencies
often have a good idea of the kinds of projects that may be subject to review in the future, and the
kinds of environmental research that would be useful to support better NEPA analysis of those
proposals. For example, even absent precise delineation of wetlands acreage in advance of specific
applications to fill wetlands,253 a district office of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) is
likely to know which areas in the region have significant areas of wetlands, which are subject to
future development under local planning and zoning, and what kinds of baseline scientific research
would be useful to help predict the impacts of development on wetland values and functions. 254 In
some cases, projects may even be anticipated in long-term agency planning documents, such as
management plans for National Forests255 or lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) subject to grazing, mining, or oil and gas development. 256
One application of translational ecology to the NEPA process, then, might be efforts by
academic and other independent scientists to engage in dialogues with agency scientists and other
officials, environmental groups, and individuals or entities who may be planning development
projects that may be subject to NEPA review. Such dialogues might anticipate the kinds of baseline
scientific research that would be most helpful in future NEPA reviews, and therefore help scientists
to develop research agendas that are relevant and useful. Indeed, although not specific to the NEPA
process alone, researchers at the University of Arizona recently convened a meeting between
scientists working in the Colorado River ecosystem, federal and state agency officials,

See 33 U.S.C. §1344 (requiring permits from ACE or a delegated state agency to discharge dredge or fill material
into waters of the United States, including wetlands subject to the CWA).
254 Applicable regulations governing required compensatory mitigation requires that mitigation projects replace the
lost or impaired wetland values and functions due to a project. See 40 C.F.R. §230.93. Because this is not simply a
matter of counting the acreage of wetlands lost and replaced or restored, more sophisticated scientific analysis is
needed to support both the section 404 permit review and any associated EIS.
255 See 36 U.S.C. §1604 (governing National Forest System planning process).
256 See 43 U.S.C. §1712 (governing planning process for public lands managed by BLM).
253
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environmental groups, tribes, and other stakeholders to help advise scientists on what additional
research would be most useful to future Colorado River restoration and management efforts.257
2. Uncertainty analysis and “incomplete or unavailable information”
Closely related to the issue of the timing of EIS preparation and the scientific information
needed to support it is the CEQ regulation governing “incomplete or unavailable information.”258
Agencies must fill existing gaps in scientific or other information where “the information relevant
to reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and
the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant.”259 Where it is impossible for an agency to
obtain such information, or where the costs of doing so is exorbitant, the agency must include in
the EIS a statement identifying the incomplete or unavailable information and its relevance to the
analysis, summarize “existing credible evidence” relevant to predicting the environmental impacts
at issue, and predict those impacts as well as possible using “theoretical approaches or research
methods generally accepted in the scientific community.”260
As noted above, the preferred approach to the problem of incomplete or unavailable
information is to find ways to anticipate NEPA’s informational needs to the maximum extent
possible, using translational ecology processes or otherwise. 261 The number actions potentially
subject to NEPA, the diverse range of potential NEPA analysis, and the scope of potential
environmental impacts so broad, however, 262 that it would be impossible even to anticipate all of
the necessary information and scientific background research comprehensively. Thus, predictive
methodology will always be a fundamental aspect of the NEPA process.
Translational ecology can play a key role as well, however, in helping to improve this
aspect of NEPA implementation. Working with agency officials and other stakeholders, based on
See Katharine Jacobs, Colorado River: Building a Science Agenda, Final Workshop Report (Oct. 10-12, 2017) (on
file with author); Colorado River: Building a Science Agenda, Decision-Makers and Interested Parties Workshop,
Final Report (Apr. 3-4, 2018) (on file with author). For purposes of full disclosure, the author participated in second
of the two meetings in this process.
258 40 C.F.R. §1502.22.
259 Id. §1502.22(a). This regulation replaced a previous regulation requiring agencies to conduct a “worst case
analysis” of potential environmental impacts in the face of uncertainty. The new regulation was upheld by the Supreme
Court in the face of a claim that a worst-case analysis was mandated by the statute. Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, supra, 490 U.S. at 354-56.
260 40 C.F.R. §1502.22(a).
261 See supra Part III.B.1.
262 See John Ruple & Kayla Race, Measuring the NEPA Litigation Burden: A Review of 1,499 Court Cases, 50
ENVTL. L. __ (forthcoming 2020);
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433437&dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_natural:resources:law:pol
icy:ejournal_abstractlink.
257
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the past need for theoretical predictive methods in impact statements and anticipated future needs,
scientists can develop research agendas to improve the accuracy and reliability of those methods.
They can also conduct research to evaluate how well previous uses of predictive methodology
have worked, for example, by monitoring actual environmental impacts of past NEPA decisions
to determine how close to the mark the agency came in predicting project impacts, and then to
propose changes to those methods or replacement methods that might perform better in the future.
Whereas the kinds of collaborative process suggested in the previous section might be regionally
focused, translational ecology programs designed to help identify research needs in the area of
predictive environmental impact methods can be national in scope or focused broadly on particular
areas of analysis. Moreover, the nature of this kind of research is not as inherently constrained by
timing as is true for research relevant to specific proposals with pending NEPA reviews. It can
assess the effectiveness of past predictions over time and contribute to improvements in future
predictive methods.
3. EIS scope and cumulative impacts analysis
A third persistent issue in NEPA implementation has been the difficulty of evaluating the
cumulative environmental impacts of a pending proposal and other projects or human disturbances
in the affected area, including other projects subject to NEPA review in the past or anticipated in
the future. Closely related legal issues are when related projects or project segments should be
considered in a single EIS, 263 and when impact statements may be “tiered” from a broader
programmatic or regional EIS to narrower or project-specific impact statements.264 Cumulative
impacts analysis is fundamentally driven by ecology and other environmental sciences, and
translational ecology again could play a role in improving this aspect of NEPA implementation.
Clearly, NEPA analysis would be less meaningful if agencies considered only the impacts
of each individual proposal in isolation. Although some proposals (such as large projects or major
agency programs) may have very significant environmental impacts taken alone, in some cases
environmental degradation comes in the form of death by a thousand cuts—such as hundreds of
smaller construction projects that, in the aggregate, impair watersheds by filling too many acres of
wetlands or degrade air quality by inducing more traffic. To address this issue, the CEQ regulations

263
264

See 40 C.F.R. §1508.25 (defining proper scope of an EIS).
See id. §1502.20 (discussing option of tiering EISs to eliminate duplication).
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require agencies to address cumulative impacts as well as direct and indirect effects, 265 defining
cumulative impact as:
… the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action
when added to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what
agencies (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative
impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place
over a period of time.266
Thus, one procedure to address cumulative impacts is for agencies to consider the
environmental effects of the pending proposal along with the effects of other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions, even though decisions on those other actions are not part of
the EIS. A second method is to broaden the scope of an EIS to consider multiple pending actions
together, even if individual actions are subject to different decision processes (such as different
permits or other approvals but addressed in a single EIS). 267 A third method is to address
cumulative environmental issues first in a broader regional or programmatic EIS, and then to “tier”
individual proposal EISs to the broader document to avoid unnecessary duplication while still
considering aggregate impacts. 268
Whichever process is used, the scientific challenges inherent in cumulative impacts
analysis are even greater than is true for individual project analysis. 269 Cumulative impact analysis
requires understanding of cause-and-effect relationships over broader temporal and geographic
scales. It also requires an understanding of ecosystem structure and function at larger scales, and
the nature of aggregate and synergistic effects. Those effects are likely to be confounded by an
40 C.F.R. §1508.8 (defining “effects”).
Id §1508.7.
267 See id. §1508.25 (defining EIS scope and suggesting that agencies consider in a single EIS actions that are
sufficiently “connected”, “cumulative”, or “similar”). Actions are “connected” if they are “closely related” because
they automatically trigger other actions with environmental impacts, are mutually dependent in order to occur, or
depend on a larger action for their justification. Id. §1508.25(a)(1). Actions are “cumulative” when they have
cumulatively significant impacts. Id. §1508.25(a)(2). Actions are “similar” if they have similarities that “provide a
basis for evaluating their environmental consequences together, such as common timing or geography.” Id.
§1508.25(a)(3). See, also, id. §1502.4(a) (requiring proposals “which are related to each other closely enough to be,
in effect, a single course of action” to be evaluated together).
268 See id. §§1502.4(b) (suggesting that agencies prepare broadly focused EISs when multiple actions are connected
geographically, generically (common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation, media, or subject
matter), or by stage of technological development); 1502.20, 1508.28 (encouraging agencies to tier EISs at multiple
levels).
269 See, e.g., L.W. Canter, Cumulative Effects and Other Analytical Challenges of NEPA, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND NEPA, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 115 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter, eds. 1997) (exploring the
challenges of cumulative impacts analysis).
265
266
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even larger range of variables than individual project impacts, making them more difficult and
complex to study, and making conclusions potentially even less certain.
The kinds of collaborative and interactive process envisioned by translational ecology
could be useful in improving the state of the art in cumulative impact assessment. At local or
regional levels, agency officials and interested scientists could convene meetings to discuss longterm monitoring and other research that might help agencies consider cumulative impacts more
effectively. Because academic and other independent scientists are not constrained to study only
those issues directly related to current projects or agency priorities, they may be in a better position
to provide baseline analysis or cumulative impacts analysis of activities approved previously.
Agencies and other stakeholders (including planners of future projects and environmental groups)
could help identify the nature, scope, and potential impacts of future projects for which background
research might be helpful. At the national level, similar collaboration between agency NEPA
officials and environmental scientists might be useful to help guide and improve the methodologies
used to evaluate cumulative impacts.
C. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act (ESA), 270 as would be expected given the focus of the statute,
also has a predominantly ecological focus, suggesting additional opportunities for translational
ecology to contribute to the development and implementation of environmental law. The purpose
of the ESA is to “provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserve [and] to provide a program for the conservation of
such endangered species and threatened species ….” 271 Thus, while a common impression of the
ESA might suggest a narrow focus on protection of individual species, the statute actually
promotes a broader, ecosystem-based approach to species conservation. 272
Moreover, several aspects of the ESA mirror the basic tenets of translational ecology. It
calls for a multidisciplinary scientific approach to species recovery and protection, 273 and expressly

16 U.S.C. §1531 et seq.
Id. §1531(b).
272 See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 640 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (D. Hawaii), aff’d, 852 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 1986). See, also, 16 U.S.C. §1533(a)(1)(A) (requiring species listing decisions to consider “destruction,
modification, or curtailment of [species] habitat or range” as well as direct indicators of species depletion).
273 See 16 U.S.C. §1532(3) (defining “conserve”, “conserving”, and “conservation” as including “all activities
associated with scientific resources management such as research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and
maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and transplantation ….”).
270
271
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invokes principles of “best science” in implementing the statute.274 It embraces collaboration
within the federal government,275 between federal agencies and state and local agencies, 276 and
between officials charged with implementing the Act and the scientific community. 277 The Act
also includes a specific exception against otherwise prohibited activities if they are conducted for
“scientific purposes,”278 thus facilitating additional scientific research on threatened or endangered
species or the ecosystems on which they rely.
Aside from this compatibility of the ESA with scientific research in general, a number of
specific ESA programs or functions suggest specific ways in which translational ecology might
support or help to improve statutory implementation:
1. Listing species and designating critical habitat
The threshold step in the ESA regulatory scheme is to determine which species are
threatened or endangered due to various factors.279 The responsible Cabinet Secretary 280 can list
species on their own initiative, or in response to petitions filed by interested persons (including
academic or other independent research scientists) to list or delist a species. 281 Concurrently with
listing a species as threatened or endangered, the Secretary is required, “to the maximum extent
prudent and determinable,” to designate any critical habitat of the species, and to revise that
designation periodically. 282
A key problem with ESA implementation has been the extensive backlog of species listing
petitions, and the ability of the agencies to evaluate the validity, credibility, and sufficiency of

See id. §§1533(b)(1)(A) (requiring species listing decisions based on “the best scientific and commercial data
available”); 1533(b)(2) (requiring critical habitat designations based on “the best scientific data available” as well as
economic impact, national security, and other relevant impacts of the decision); 1536(a)(2) (requiring all federal
agencies to base species jeopardy findings on “the best scientific and commercial data available”).
275 See id. §1536(a) (requiring federal agency consultation for actions that may jeopardize species or habitat).
276 See id. §§1531(c)(2) (encouraging federal cooperation with state and local agencies); 1535 (requiring federal-state
cooperation “to the maximum extent practicable” through management agreements, cooperative agreements, and
otherwise).
277 See id. §§1533(b)(5)(D) (requiring notice of regulations to professional scientific organizations as the Secretary
deems appropriate), 1533(f)(2) (authorizing Secretary to enlist the services of “appropriate public and private agencies
and institutions, and other qualified persons”).
278 Id. §1539(a)(1)(A).
279 Relevant factors include habitat destruction or impairment, overutilization, disease or predation, inadequate
regulation, or other natural or human factors. See id. §1533(a)(1).
280 For most purposes, the ESA is administered by the Secretary of the Interior for terrestrial and freshwater species,
and the Secretary of Commerce for marine and anadromous species. See id. §1532(15).
281 See 16 U.S.C. §1533(a).
282 See id. §1533(a)(3)(A).
274
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information suggesting that a species should be listed or delisted. 283 Although the statute prescribes
deadlines for Secretarial action in response to listing, delisting, or critical habitat petitions, 284
significant delays in the process285 have led to litigation to try to expedite agency decisions.286
The scientific and other factors involved in determining whether a species is sufficiently
threatened or endangered to warrant listing, 287 and to determine what areas should be designated
as critical habitat,288 are undoubtedly complex. For example, what information suffices to
determine that a species is threatened or endangered, 289 and what recovery levels suffice to justify
delisting? 290 What attributes indicate that particular habitat areas are “critical” to species recovery
and conservation?291 How should species categorized for purposes of determining whether distinct
subpopulations should be considered separately for listing purposes? 292 These issues require
significant data collection and analysis to allow fully informed agency decisions, and agency
scientists lack sufficient time and resources to fill those gaps.293 Academic and other independent
scientists can conduct additional research to support the ESA listing and critical habitat designation
processes. Rather than engaging in “curiosity-driven” science focused on those species or
ecological systems an ecologist or other environmental scientists finds intellectually “interesting”,
translational ecologists can pursue research agendas designed to fill the key existing information
gaps that impede species listing and critical habitat designation.

See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Act Petitions Received by Fish and Wildlife Service,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/table/petitions-received.html (documenting 157 currently active petitions).
284 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§1533(b)(3)(A) (requiring Secretary to determine whether petition presents “substantial
scientific or commercial information” indicating that petition may be warranted); 1533(b)(3)(B) (requiring Secretary
to issue findings within 12 months of receipt of such a petition).
285 See Emily E. Puckett, Dylan C. Kesler, & D. Noah Greenwald, Taxa, Petitioning Agency, and Lawsuits Affect Time
Spent Awaiting Listing Under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 201 BIOL. CONSERVATION 220 (2016) finding median
of 12.1 years between initial consideration and listing).
286 See In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litigation—MDL No. 2165, 704 F.3d 962 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(denying motion by hunting group to intervene in litigation); see, also, In re Endangered Species Act Section 4
Deadline Litigation, Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement, 2011 WL 2695639 (D.D.C. July 12, 2011).
287 See 16 U.S.C. §1533(a)(1), (b)(1).
288 See id. §1533(b)(2).
289 See, e.g., Northern Spotted Owl (Strix Occidentalis Caurina) v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 482-83 (W.D. Wash.
1988) (requiring agency to consider all expert opinion on population viability).
290 See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1024-29 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that
FWS failed to consider all relevant evidence and articulate rational connection between scientific evidence and
conclusion reached in delisting grizzly bear).
291 See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 770 F. Supp.2d 68 (D.D.C. 2011) (reviewing critical habitat
determinations for Cape Sable seaside sparrow).
292 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp.2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2010) (reviewing Secretary’s
determination regarding distinct population segments of Rocky Mountain grey wolf).
293 See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
283
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The most obvious way to inform research agendas might simply be for scientists to analyze
pending listing and habitat designation petitions, which are a matter of public record.294 One
potential danger in relying solely on listing petition backlogs, however, is that the citizen listing
petition process might drive the scientific agenda, rather than vice versa. Although many petitions
may be legitimate, the process is subject to some potential abuse if project proponents petition the
agency to list a species that might be affected by that project solely for that purpose. Of course,
listing may or may not be justified, and petitioners might be sincere in their motives, but those
motives might not focus on the most important or the most critically threatened or endangered
species, thus distorting scientific and agency priorities relative to the overall goals of the ESA.
Moreover, independent scientific research unrelated to pending agency proposals or petitions
might be the only way some species are identified as threatened or endangered in the first place. 295
If scientists limit their research to pending agency agendas, such discoveries might be missed.
Given these competing factors, a more considered process of translational ecology could
be used to optimize the value of independent scientific research in supporting ESA
implementation. Scientists could meet with agency officials responsible for implementing the ESA
to review what research would be most useful in assisting with regulatory backlogs, and what
independent research in particular ecosystems would also be valuable. Environmental groups and
project developers may also be interested in discussing ways to expedite regulatory decisions,
because delays ultimately harm all participants in the ESA process. This kind of collaborative
process would not be binding, of course, leaving scientists free to exercise independent judgment
in designing and pursuing their research agendas, but those judgments would be better informed
in ways that might result in more relevant and actionable work.
2. Recovery plans and monitoring
Once a species is listed and any critical habitat designated, the agencies are required to
adopt protective regulations296 and recovery plans297 providing for conservation and survival of
the species. Recovery plans must include site-specific management actions necessary to protect

See supra note 283; 16 U.S.C. §1533(b) (requiring the Secretary to publish public notices of listing findings).
In the most famous example of that phenomenon, the Supreme Court reported in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
that it was the research of a University of Tennessee scientist that identified the peril of the snail darter jeopardized
by completion of the Tellico Dam. See 437 U.S. at 158-59.
296 16 U.S.C. §1533(d).
297 Id. §1533(f).
294
295
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the species and promote its recovery, “objective, measurable criteria” to track progress and
determine when a species might be delisted, and the estimated time and cost of recovery.298
Development of recovery plans under the ESA has also proven to be quite challenging, and
this aspect of the ESA process has also been subject to significant backlogs. 299 Agency resource
limitations may explain part of that slow progress, but a major contributing factor may be scientific
uncertainty about the causes of species impairment, the actions most likely to contribute to
recovery, the challenges of monitoring populations (particularly given inevitable population
volatility), and the appropriate criteria for determining when recovery can be declared. Even when
plans are adopted and implemented, and populations are monitored effectively, disputes arise
about whether delisting is appropriate, or whether it might result in a relapse absent continuation
of protective regulations and affirmative restoration measures. 300 Those disputes include both
value judgments about the degree of conservatism appropriate to use before declaring successful
recovery, and scientific judgments about factors such as the number of distinct populations that
should exist to ensure overall species resilience to future risks and genetic variability to prevent
unhealthy uniformity in the species gene pool—known as “metapopulation” analysis.301
Congress anticipated the challenges and scientific expertise needs posed by the recovery
planning, implementation, and monitoring process. It authorized the agencies to “procure the
services of appropriate public and private agencies and institutions, and other qualified persons,”
and to develop recovery teams exempt from compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee
Act302 to facilitate their operation. 303 Thus, despite its scientific complexity and difficulty, in two
respects it may be easier to pursue translational ecology in the recovery process than in the listing
and critical habitat phase of ESA implementation. First, the universe of recovery planning targets

Id. §1533(f)(1)(B).
See Jacob W. Malcom & Ya-Wei Li, Missing, Delayed, and Old: The Status of ESA Recovery Plans, 2018
CONSERVATION LETTERS e12601, DOI: 10.1111/conl.1260 (finding that nearly one fourth of listed species lack
recovery plans, half of plans took more than five years to prepare after listing, and half of recovery plans have not
been updated in 20 years or more).
300 See, e.g. RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 92, at 120-131 (discussing uncertainties in
recovery plans and goals for endangered Colorado River fish species).
301 See Mark Shaffer, Minimum Viable Populations” Coping with Uncertainty, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR
CONSERVATION (Michael E. Soulé ed. 1987); Illkka A. Hanski & Daniel Simberloff, The Metapopulation Approach:
Its History, Conceptual Domain, and Application to Conservation, in METAPOPULATION BIOLOGY, ECOLOGY,
GENETICS, AND EVOLUTION (Illkka A. Hanski & Michel E. Gilpen, eds. 1997).
302 Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (Oct. 6, 1972), codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 2. See infra Part IV for a discussion of
the relevance of FACA to translational ecology.
303 16 U.S.C. §1533(f)(2).
298
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for scientific researchers is defined by the species already listed as threatened or endangered, and
for which the agencies must, or already have, adopted recovery plans. Second, the existing
statutory authority for collaborative, interdisciplinary recovery teams provides a built-in process
for the practice of translational ecology. Notably, there is reason to expect that the recovery process
might be more amenable to multi-stakeholder collaboration than other aspects of ESA
implementation. Once the agency lists a species as threatened or endangered, all involved
stakeholders have an incentive to promote effective species recovery.
3. Interagency consultation
Another key ESA implementing mechanism is the affirmative requirement imposed in
section 7 of the ESA for any federal agency, in consultation with the Secretary, to “insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency … is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of” designated critical habitat for those species.304 This is among the most farreaching of the ESA’s provisions because it applies throughout the federal government.305 As such,
it is also among the statute’s most controversial provisions, with the potential to stop otherwise
popular projects or economic activities in their tracks.306
The fact that Congress imposed this stringent mandate on every federal agency, in
consultation with the Secretary, dictates that agencies themselves are required to do the work
necessary to implement this provision. That includes the requirement for agencies to prepare a
“biological assessment” to determine whether the proposed action might jeopardize any
threatened or endangered species identified by the Secretary in the project area.307 Based on that
preliminary assessment and other information, the Secretary is then obligated to prepare a
“biological opinion” determining the extent to which the proposed action might jeopardize listed
species or impair their critical habitat, and if such jeopardy or impairment is found, to identify
“reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the proposed action to avoid those impacts. 308
Although section 7 of the ESA imposes duties directly on federal agencies, Congress was
again clear that the interagency consultation process must be based on “the best scientific and
16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2).
This aspect of the ESA is similar to NEPA in that it applies to all federal agencies, not only to specific agencies
designated to protect and manage environmental resources and values.
306 See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, supra.
307 16 U.S.C. §1536(c).
308 Id. §1536(b)(3), (4).
304
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commercial information available.”309 This suggests additional opportunities for translational
ecologists to support the scientific integrity of the consultation process. As was true for the timing
of the NEPA process,310 however, if scientists only become aware of and involved in research
relevant to the section 7 consultation process once consultation begins, the time limitations in that
section311 may prevent new science from influencing the process significantly. The absence of
meaningful scientific research in advance of interagency consultation, however, might
compromise the integrity and effectiveness of the analysis. This suggests that translational
ecologists might increase the relevance of their research agendas by meeting frequently with
agency officials, project proponents, and other interested stakeholders to develop and pursue
research that might improve future section 7 consultations.
IV.

Broader Potential Implications of Translational Ecology for Environmental Law
Part III suggested several key examples of existing federal environmental statutes that

provide opportunities for scientists to practice the principles of translational ecology usefully and
effectively. That alone suggests that translational ecology has the potential to improve the
implementation and effectiveness of those statutory programs. The attributes and aspirations of
translational ecology identified in Part II, however, as explicated by the examples in Part III, may
suggest even broader and more systemic implications for our approach to public environmental
law. Although opinion polls suggest that environmental protection is a widely shared value in the
United States, 312 environmental law and policy have often been contentious and politicized. 313
It would be naïve to suggest the viability of any “silver bullet” solutions to this trend, but
several of the attributes of translational ecology suggest ways in which it might shift the focus of
environmental disputes relatively in the direction of consensus and collaboration that public
opinion polls suggest should be the norm. The following preliminary analysis suggests two related
ways in which such a transformation might begin.

Id. §1536(a)(2).
See supra Part III.B.1.
311 See 16 U.S.C. §1526(b) (imposing time limits on consultation process).
312 The Pew Research Center, for example, reported in 2017 that nearly three quarters of Americans strongly favor
strong measures to protect the environment, despite deep partisan divides on the issue. See Monica Anderson, For
Earth Day, How Americans View Environmental Issues, Apr. 20, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/04/20/for-earth-day-heres-how-americans-view-environmental-issues/.
313 See Cory Brosnahan, When Did the Environment Become a Partisan Issue?, AMERICAN EXPERIENCE/PBS, Jan. 26,
2017,
https://medium.com/americanexperiencepbs/when-did-the-environment-become-a-partisan-issuef914f0ce489e#.vu06dtc6j.
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A. Collaborative science in public environmental law
Many legal disputes are characterized by a “battle of experts.” Litigation results may turn
on judicial or jury decisions about the correctness of competing sets of scientific experts in cases
ranging from garden variety traffic accidents 314 to complex medical malpractice cases315 to private
environmental disputes in the realm of toxic torts.316 In an adversarial legal system, it makes sense
that private parties will retain competing experts to debate competing scientific theories about the
cause and effects of injuries and other matters involved in those private disputes. Although the
accuracy of the result is important to the individual litigants, society’s interest in the matter is in
ensuring that the decision process is fair and that the system as a whole is likely to reach the
“correct” result more often than not.
Public environmental disputes317 are also characterized frequently by battles of experts,
whether between agency scientists and experts retained by industry, environmental groups, or both.
Such disputes may involve the scientific support for an agency regulation,318 the degree to which
pollution from one or more sources has caused harm, 319 or the viability and justification of
proposed methods to restore an ecosystem or compensate for past harm. 320 In such cases, the nature
of the scientific disputes themselves may be similar to those in purely private environmental
matters. Which side has collected the best and most reliable data? Whose scientific theory or
analysis of the data is more likely to be correct?
The public’s stake in this kind of dispute, however, includes but also transcends the legal
goal of ensuring due process and system designed to “get it right” more often than not. Because
the resolution of public environmental disputes or regulatory decisions affects public health and
welfare, as well as the protection, use, and management of public natural resources, the public also
See, e.g., Dufrene v. Willingham, 721 So.2d 1026, (La.App. 5 Cir. 1998) (evaluating qualifications of accident
reconstruction experts).
315 See, e.g., Seastrunk v. United States, 25 F. Supp.3d 812 (D. So.Car. 2014) (discussing essential requirement of
expert evidence in proving medical malpractice claim).
316 See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) (evaluating disputes over causation
and resulting injury due to groundwater contamination).
317 Even though some individuals, businesses, or other groups may be affected by the result of an environmental
regulatory dispute more than others, I consider a public environmental dispute to be one in which more parties than
the immediate litigants have a significant stake in the result, up to and including the public at large.
318 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (evaluating scientific
justification for workplace exposure standard for benzene).
319 See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (evaluating
agency evidence of health effects from lead exposure).
320 See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 623 F. Supp.2d 1015 (D. Ariz. 2009) (adjudicating
adequacy of government efforts to restore Colorado River ecosystem downstream of Glen Canyon Dam).
314
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has a compelling interest in the substance of the dispute. In a private dispute, absent a mutually
beneficial settlement or mediated resolution, one party or the other will always lose, even if the
result turns out to be incorrect. In a public environmental dispute, an incorrect scientific conclusion
could result in harm to large members of the public, 321 including irreversible human or
environmental harm or lost or depleted resources that cannot be recovered. 322
The judicial approach to this issue is to err on the side of agency scientists and other public
officials to whom Congress (or a state legislature) delegates responsibility to protect and promote
the public welfare. Thus, scientific disputes involving regulatory decisions typically are subject to
an “arbitrary and capricious”323 or “substantial evidence” standard of review,324 although that is
not true for all disputes between public entities and private parties in environmental disputes
involving competing experts. 325 Agency scientists have no personal stake in the outcome, and
unlike experts retained by private parties are not hired for the purpose of proving a particular
scientific proposition beneficial to that side. Deferring to agency experts, therefore, presumably
does not impair our quest to base environmental policy decisions on science that is more likely
than not to be correct. It does not, however, eliminate the adversarial approach to environmental
science that has characterized, if not dominated, public discourse about environmental issues in
and out of the courts. The raging debate about the validity of climate science 326 is perhaps the most
vivid and divisive example of that tendency.
It is entirely appropriate for competing resource users and other members of the public to
debate policy issues relevant to environmental protection and natural resource management.
Indeed, given the range of legitimate views about competing resource uses and values, that is
healthy in a pluralistic society. Decisions that properly consider and balance those competing

See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) (deciding whether
analysis of safety of Three Mile Island nuclear power plant must consider psychological harm to large numbers of
community members).
322 See, e.g., In re: the Exxon Valdez, 27 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing propriety of punitive and other damages
in light of irreversible damage to natural resources).
323 See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insur. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
(explaining arbitrary and capricious standard of review).
324 See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(E); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148 (2019) (discussing substantial evidence standard of
review).
325 A civil enforcement action brought by an agency for violation of an environmental standard typically is subject to
the same “preponderance of the evidence” standard applicable to civil disputes between private parties. A criminal
enforcement action is necessarily subject to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard needed to satisfy criminal due
process standards.
326 See KARI MARIE NORGAARD, LIVING IN DENIAL: CLIMATE CHANGE, EMOTIONS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2011).
321
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views should turn on a combination of legal, social, and economic factors, as proponents of
translational ecology acknowledge.
Those decisions should also be informed adequately, however, by sound science. Stated
simply, if we cannot reach reasonable consensus on the state of the relevant science—even if that
consensus identifies and quantifies uncertainties and remaining unknowns—we will not be able to
reach consensus on the surrounding policy issues. Granted, the scientific process does not generate
a singular “truth” about any given issue but rather seeks continued improvement in scientific
knowledge and understanding. Moreover, science often generates legitimate competing theories
and explanations. Nevertheless, the idea that advocates for particular policy positions should
generate their own version of sound science to serve their intended policy goals, rather than as a
means of seeking truth through legitimate competing theories, is equally inconsistent with the
scientific method. It is also not compatible with society’s goal to reach well-informed decisions
about important matters of public environmental policy. The persistence of climate science denial
is the clearest and most dangerous current example of that phenomenon.327
The concept of translational ecology may suggest a process to transcend these persistent
debates fueled by the inherently adversarial nature of our litigation and administrative law
processes. Collaborative efforts could identify scientific research agendas most useful in
deciding and acting on the most important environmental protection and natural resource
management issues. Those collaborations could involve interdisciplinary groups of scientists,
agency officials responsible for the relevant decisions, and other stakeholders such as affected
residents, resource users (industry, agriculture, etc.), and environmental groups. Academic and
other independent scientists, in addition to any government scientists working on the issue, could
pursue that research and convene periodically to share results and determine what degree of
consensus is possible on the relevant issues. To the extent possible, decisions could proceed on
the basis of that shared consensus. Ideally, the process would generate increasing trust over time
if the resulting scientific research and analysis is perceived as objective rather than beholden to
particular interest groups.

See, generally, NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS
OBSUCRED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO TO GLOBAL WARMING (2010) (chronicling industry efforts to
generate doubt about important public health and environmental risks).
327
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It would be naïve to believe that this kind of process will eliminate all disputes about the
environmental science relevant to important policy decisions. No private or government process
can force individuals or organizations to accept or believe any scientific theory, evidence, or
explanation against their will, or contrary to their interests. Indeed, there is some risk that some
participants might “game” such a system by participating when convenient but disclaiming the
results or failing to reach consensus when it does not further their interests to do so. The same is
true for regulatory negotiations, 328 however, or any other dispute resolution process that relies on
the integrity of the process and good will of the participants.
No additional legal authority or process is essential to facilitate the use of translational
ecology in this way to improve the shared knowledge base on which environmental decisions are
made through existing statutory and regulatory mechanisms. Translational ecology collaborations
can be convened with varying degrees of formality, by scientists themselves, agencies, groups of
stakeholders, and any combination thereof. They can stand alone or be used in conjunction with
any of the examples discussed in Part III, or other appropriate environmental law programs or
decisions. Once sufficient experience with the process has been gained, however, particularly if
initial experiments succeed, additional statutory authority might be useful to further legitimize and
facilitate the process. Congress might, for example, create additional exceptions to the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), as it has done in the ESA.329 It might amend NEPA or other
statutory processes to provide specifically for translational ecology processes, and potentially
provide funding to encourage and support them. 330 Whatever degree of formal process is used,
however, translational ecology has potential to improve the manner in which we use science to
inform public environmental decisions.
B. Translational ecology and the administrative process
The concept of translational ecology also raises questions about the role and status of
academic and other independent scientists as public intellectuals providing assistance to a public
process. Presumably, to the extent that independent scientists provide input into a public process,

See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the
Public Interest, 46 DUKE L. J. 1351 (1997) (critiquing the promise of regulatory negotiation).
329 See supra notes 302-303 and accompanying text.
330 It is not unreasonable to predict that, in many cases, the total cost of achieving consensus on scientific issues
collaboratively is likely to be considerably less than the cost of generating competing scientific research, and then
litigating which is more “correct” as between the competing theories or evidence.
328
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such as informal notice and comment rulemaking, 331 independent scientists are subject to the same
legal privileges and constraints as other individuals or entities regarding access to agency officials
and the agency process. Privileges include the right to comment on proposed agency rules or other
actions subject to public notice and comment, 332 and constraints include those imposed by
FACA333 and other limits designed to ensure that some individuals and interest groups do not enjoy
superior access to government decisions and decision makers than others.
Of course, there are a number of ways in which academic and other scientists might
legitimately be provided special opportunities to inform agency decisions and processes. They
might receive federal grant funding specifically to engage in scientific research relevant to agency
programs. They might serve as consultants or contractors working on specific research or advisory
tasks for an agency. They might be appointed to serve on advisory boards or committees created
by Congress pursuant to statute, such as EPA’s Science Advisory Board, 334 or by an agency
pursuant to FACA.
Short of that kind of special status, however, independent scientists have the same
relationship to agency officials as other citizens, even though they do not ordinarily act on behalf
of particular interest groups. 335 They might present research and other information, including
opinions about matters that might bear on public environmental policy, in neutral forums such as
academic or professional conferences or meetings; and obviously agency officials have access to
the results of their published research. That is different, however, than engaging in a collaborative
process of translational ecology in which scientists meet with agency officials to help develop
research agendas more likely to be useful to agency decisions and other actions, and then to
communicate their research results to the agency in an ongoing and iterative process. That might
well be perceived as a violation of FACA336 or other rules limiting access by outside individuals
to agency decisions and process.

See 5 U.S.C. §553.
See id. §553(c).
333 5 U.S.C. App.2.
334 See 42 U.S.C. §4365.
335 Individual scientists, of course, may well hold particular personal beliefs about issues of environmental policy, and
may be members of professional organizations or advocacy groups that might take positions on particular issues.
336 An “advisory committee” subject to the limitations of FACA includes any committee “established or utilized by
one or more agencies.” FACA §3(2)(C). See Center for Auto Safety v. Tiemann, 414 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1976).
331
332
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One key exception to FACA is for advisory committees established by the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) or the National Academy of Public Administration.337 Thus, NAS
might play a role in facilitating translational ecology by creating committees of environmental
scientists to work with agencies and other end users of environmental science to help scientists
increase the utility of their research to agency officials. NAS committees, however, typically are
formed to address specific—if often important and broadly focused—issues in which science plays
a key role in informing public policy. Moreover, FACA includes restrictions designed to ensure
that agencies to not rely on the NAS exception to circumvent FACA’s purposes.338
Alternatively, of course, agencies could simply comply with the requirements of FACA in
establishing translational ecology collaborations. That requires steps such as public notice, open
public meetings, opportunities for public comment, recordkeeping and availability of public
records, etc.339 Such requirements are entirely sensible for advisory committees comprised of
interest group representatives that otherwise might have inappropriate, disproportionate, and
undisclosed access to agency officials. 340 They may be perceived as unduly burdensome for
purposes of consultations about the research of outside scientists. Moreover, one purpose of FACA
was to prevent the proliferation of federal advisory committees and their sunset once no longer
useful,341 and each FACA committee must be formally approved by the President or a federal
agency head.342 Thus, the FACA process may be too burdensome to facilitate translational ecology
consultations, especially at local or regional levels.
In light of these considerations, it seems legitimate to ask whether steps should be taken to
modify the ways in which independent scientists can interact with administrative agency officials
to facilitate the work of translational ecology, through specific statutory authority, additional but
conditioned exemptions to FACA, or otherwise. Unconstrained exemptions could be problematic

FACA §3(2). FACA also exempts advisory committees created by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Reserve System, or the Director of National Intelligence for reasons of national security. Id. §4(b).
338 The statute prohibits agencies from relying on the advice of NAS committees if they exercise management control
over such committees, unless they comply with requirements equivalent to those that apply to FACA committees to
ensure public notice and a balance of representation on the committee. FACA §15. See Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (case involving allegation of FACA violations by Department of
Energy in connection with NAS Committee).
339 FACA §§ 9-12.
340 See Huron Envtl. Activist League v. U.S. EPA, 917 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1996).
341 FACA has the dual purposes of preventing creation of and ensuring the sunset of unnecessary advisory committees,
and of ensuring public accountability for committees that are formed. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala,
104 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rehearing en banc denied, 114 F.3d 1209, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 949.
342 FACA §9(a).
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if they allow an unintended “back door” for interest groups to influence agency officials and
decisions in ways the APA and FACA are designed to prevent. The goals of translational ecology
are sufficiently laudable, however, that it would be unfortunate if they cannot be achieved due to
restrictions on agency access designed to prevent problems that are not relevant or significant in
this context.
V.

Conclusion
Translational ecology shares some elements with predecessor methods or theories of

applied environmental science, such as conservation biology, adaptive management, resilience
theory, and ecosystem and watershed management. All of those ideas have had significant and
largely positive impacts on environmental and natural resource law, and those impacts are likely
to continue. At least in its formative stages, however, translational ecology appears to be more
broadly conceptualized than some of those earlier methods, and more procedurally focused than
others. These attributes suggest that it may have broader applicability to environmental law than
any of the predecessor ideas.
Viewed in the most optimistic light, translational ecology’s collaborative and trust-building
approach to generating “actionable” environmental science has the potential to improve the
implementation of various environmental statutes and programs. Providing better, more targeted
scientific analysis in ways that are trusted by a wider range of stakeholders could help to achieve
a greater degree of consensus about the core scientific information needed to make sound
environmental policy decisions, rather than continuing to engage in endless “battles of experts”
over every relevant set of scientific issues.343 That could focus environmental decisionmakers and
stakeholders on the key legal, social, economic, and other trans-scientific factors needed to reach
decisions in light of the underlying science.
It would be a mistake, however, to anticipate that translational ecology alone will result in
easy consensus on all disputed environmental issues—particularly those for which stakeholders
have deeply entrenched positions. First, if powerful interest groups continue to benefit from
contesting the relevant science, even in areas such as climate science where the scientific
consensus is so robust, they are likely to continue that denialism. Second, the social, political, and
economic factors that underlie some of our most longstanding and deeply fought environmental

It would be highly unrealistic, of course, to expect that scientific disputes in environmental law will end, particularly
in litigation contexts.
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battles may continue to dominate the debates in those areas. Viewed in the most cynical light,
recent events demonstrate how readily politics can undermine science.344
Those limitations, however, should not deter ecologists and other environmental scientists
from using translational ecology to improve the scientific basis for environmental decisions and
programs. Better and more relevant information will always move us in the direction of better
environmental outcomes.

See, e.g., Associated Press, Trump Administration Moves to Weaken Endangered Species Act, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
12, 2019, available at https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-12/trump-endangered-species-act; Pt. II.A.1.b,
supra (discussing Trump Administration withdrawal of CWA rule supported by extensive scientific synthesis).
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